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Abstract 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a planning process used to predict, assess, mitigate, 
and monitor the potential environmental and social impacts that may be associated with a 
proposed development project. Essential to the efficacy of EIA is follow-up - a post-decision 
process that attempts to understand EIA outcomes and provides feedback on project development 
and learning processes to improve environmental management practices.  While considerable 
literature on follow-up related themes exists, the actual implementation and engagement of all 
stakeholders involved with follow-up in post-consent decision stages lacks or is not done well.  
That being said, in northern Canada, and in the mining sector in general, much of this post-
decision activity is occurring under a new institutional arrangement: privatized community-
industry Environmental Agreements and associated community-based monitoring programs.  
Based on a case study of follow-up in northern Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry, this 
thesis examines both the institutional development of EIA follow-up and the role and 
contribution of community-based Environmental Agreements to EIA follow-up and impact 
management practices.  This thesis adopted a manuscript-style format; both utilized a combined 
methodology of document review and semi-structured interviews. The first manuscript focuses 
on the institutional development of follow-up in the northern Saskatchewan uranium mining 
industry, giving context to the current situation.  Results demonstrate that follow-up in 
Saskatchewan’s uranium industry has transformed and is characterized by four themes ranging 
from little or no follow-up to a new system that now includes a participatory yet privatized 
process based on privatized agreements.  Results suggest that follow-up has evolved to a current 
emphasis on environmental management incorporating a ‘community-centric’ approach, 
recognition of socioeconomic issues in monitoring programs, and an increased community and 
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industry presence in follow-up and monitoring activities.  The second manuscript examines the 
nature and scope of the northern Saskatchewan uranium industry’s Environmental Agreement 
and its potential role in EIA follow-up.  Results indicate that although privatized Environmental 
Agreements and community-led monitoring programs complement and supplement formal EIA 
follow-up processes and contribute to environmental management practices, they do not have the 
capacity to replace EIA follow-up.  Results from this thesis advance current knowledge and 
understanding of the evolution of EIA follow-up and the current role and contribution of 
privatized agreements to post-decision follow-up and impact management practices.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a systematic process that proactively examines the 
consequences of projects and related development actions (Arts et al., 2001; Morrison-Saunders 
and Bailey, 1999). In Canada, EIA was formally introduced in 1973 through the Federal 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) (Boyd, 2003; Gibson, 2002; Mitchell, 
1995), which was replaced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) in 1995 and 
revised in 2003 (Noble and Bronson, 2005).  EIA is not a mechanism for preventing 
development actions; rather it is a tool to ensure that decisions concerning development are made 
in the full knowledge of their environmental consequences (Bronson, 2005; Noble, 2006). The 
EIA process is comprised of several procedural elements, with its application varying at each 
jurisdictional level (for a comparative review see Wood, 2003; Munn 1979); however, a generic 
set of sequential steps does exist in EIA, commencing with project description and ending with 
implementation and follow-up (Table 1.1).  
Follow-up, within the context of EIA, broadly refers to the monitoring and evaluation of 
the impacts of a project for the purposes of managing and communicating the environmental 
performance of that project (Marshall et al., 2005; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004; Noble and 
Storey, 2005; Arts et al., 2001). Follow-up is a fundamental element of the EIA process as it is 
concerned with the results that occur once a consent decision for a project has been granted.  
Thus, follow-up is not only important when determining the outcomes of EIA but is essential to 
providing concrete evidence of environmental outcomes while allowing practitioners and 
stakeholders to move from a theoretical perspective on a proposal to understanding the real 
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effects once projects are implemented (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004a; Ramos et al., 2004; 
Arts et al., 2001).  
 
Table 1.1 – Generic EIA Process 
 
 
Project description 
 
 
Screening 
 
 
 
 
Scoping 
 
 
Impact prediction 
and evaluation 
 
Impact 
management 
 
Review and 
decision 
 
 
Implementation 
and follow-up 
 
 
Description of the proposed action, including its alternatives, and details 
sufficient for an assessment. 
 
Determination of whether the action is subject to an EIA under the 
regulations or guidelines present, and if so what type or level of assessment 
is required. 
 
Delineation of the key issues and the boundaries to be considered in the 
assessment, including the baseline conditions and scoping of alternatives. 
 
Prediction of environmental impacts and determination of impact significance. 
 
 
Identification of impact management and mitigation strategies, and 
development of environmental management or protection plans. 
 
Technical and public review of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and 
related documents, and subsequent recommendation as to whether the 
proposed action should proceed and under what conditions. 
 
Implementation of project and associated management measures; continuous 
data collection to monitor compliance with conditions and regulations; 
monitoring the effectiveness of impact management measures and the accuracy 
of impact predictions. 
  
  -
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
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Source: Noble, 2006:13 
 
 
Despite its importance, however, follow-up has not satisfactorily been implemented in 
practice (Ramos et. al., 2004; Noble and Macharia, 2004; Austin, 2000; Hui, 2000), and has yet 
to be recognized as an integral part of EIA (Marshall, 2001; Arts et al., 2001). In many countries 
follow-up is considered the weakest step in the EIA process (Glasson et. al., 2005). Follow-up in 
the post-consent decision stages of EIA is performed in only a minority of cases and has been 
described as the missing link between EIA and effective project management (Ramos et al., 
2004; Arts et al. 2001). In those cases where follow-up has been done, it has taken place at the 
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level of the regulator and the proponent with much less attention to actively engaging 
communities and stakeholders in follow-up and monitoring activities (Morrison-Saunders and 
Arts, 2005). Partly the reason for this, according to Galbraith et al. (2007), is that the current EIA 
process does not adequately provide project-specific follow-up, consider benefits, or build trust 
and capacity among stakeholders. In Canada, this is particularly the case in the North, where 
follow-up and EIA itself have been given only limited attention (see Noble and Bronson, 2006; 
Mulvihill and Baker, 2001). 
In recent years, however, the focus of EIA follow-up has shifted from that of monitoring 
and evaluating impact predictions towards linking up with environmental management and more 
recently communication about environmental performance with stakeholders and the community 
(Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005). Under conventional EIA systems, when follow-up is 
conducted, the typical parties involved are the regulator and the proponent, with follow-up based 
on a set of commitments made by the proponent in the environmental impact statement or based 
on the requirements of project approval set out by the regulator. The community is frequently 
involved only in tokenistic consultation practices. That being said, Arts et al. (2001) argue that 
recently there has there been a shift toward more actively engaging communities in the post-
decision stage of EIA – that of follow-up and monitoring.  In northern Canada, and in the mining 
sector in general, much of this post-decision engagement is occurring under a new institutional 
arrangement: privatized community-industry Environmental Agreements and associated 
community-based monitoring programs.  
 
1.2 Environmental Agreements 
 
Environmental Agreements are one of three types of agreements often negotiated between a 
community and industrial proponent as part of the EIA process. Whereas Socioeconomic 
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Agreements (SA) and Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) focus on broader economic 
development and the specific benefits that a community can expect from development in 
exchange for support and cooperation, Environmental Agreements are focused on project impact 
mitigation, monitoring, and follow-up (Galbraith et al., 2007). Environmental Agreements cover 
the entirety of a project, including: construction, operation, rehabilitation, and decommission, 
and seek to facilitate the participation of Aboriginal peoples, governments, and resource 
developers in the environmental management of projects in ways that do not occur under existing 
regulatory regimes (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). In this way, such agreements have the potential to 
supplement existing EIA and regulatory processes and to involve key actors in creating 
institutional structures and management processes deliberately and specifically designed to 
facilitate indigenous involvement and to promote effective follow-up and adaptive management 
over the course of a project. The problem, however, is that notwithstanding the increasing 
popularity of Environmental Agreements, little is known about their nature and role - particularly 
in the post-decision stages of EIA follow-up.   Aside from O’Faircheallaigh (2007), Galbraith et 
al. (2007), and O’Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2005) there has been little research on emerging 
Environmental Agreements, and even less concerning the nature of these agreements and their 
role in project and community impact management and follow-up.   
 
1.3 Purpose 
EIA follow-up is said to have evolved, and part of this evolution is the emergence of privatized 
agreements; however, little is known about the nature of this evolution and of the current role of 
privatized agreements in facilitating follow-up practice. As such, the overall purpose of this 
research is to advance current knowledge and understanding of the evolution of EIA follow-up 
 4
and the current role and contribution of privatized agreements to post-decision follow-up and 
impact management practices.  In pursuit of this purpose, this thesis adopts a case study of 
Northern Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry and its associated Environmental Agreement. 
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
i. to examine the institutional development of EIA follow-up and its changing roles and 
stakes; and 
ii. to examine the role and contribution of community-based Environmental Agreements to 
EIA follow-up and impact management practices.  
 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis adopts a manuscript-style format. Following this introduction two manuscripts are 
presented, each corresponding to one of the above research objectives. The first manuscript, 
‘From Public Inquiry to Private Partnership: The Institutional Development and Evolution of 
Environmental Impact Assessment Follow-up in Saskatchewan’s Uranium Mining Industry’ 
focuses on the emergence and development of follow-up in Saskatchewan’s uranium mining 
industry, giving context to the current situation.  The second manuscript, ‘The Contribution of 
Privatized Agreements to Environmental Impact Assessment Follow-up in Saskatchewan’s 
Uranium Mining Industry’, further explores the nature and scope of the Athabasca region 
Environmental Agreement and its potential role in EIA follow-up.  The conclusion to the thesis 
reflects on the changing roles and stakes of EIA follow-up and the role and contributions that 
Environmental Agreements bring to the EIA follow-up process.  References are self contained in 
each manuscript and each thesis chapter.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
FROM PUBLIC INQUIRY TO PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP IN 
SASKATCHEWAN’S URANIUM MINING INDUSTRY  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) follow-up is concerned with the results that occur once 
a consent decision for a project has been granted. The activities that comprise follow-up 
commonly range from monitoring and evaluating to managing and communicating the 
environmental outcomes that occur from a project.  As the principle goals of follow-up are to 
improve project implementation with respect to environmental outcomes and to provide 
feedback on the EIA process, follow-up is a critical component of environmental management; it 
“provides concrete evidence of environmental outcomes” (Morrison-Saunders, 2004: 3). In other 
words, follow-up not only provides information about the consequences of an activity as they 
occur, but it provides the responsible parties with the information needed to take appropriate 
measures to mitigate or prevent adverse effects on the environment (Ramos et al., 2004). By 
incorporating such feedback into the EIA process, follow-up provides for better project 
management, allows learning from experience to occur, and informs proponents, regulators, and 
stakeholders through communication about a project’s environmental performance (Marshall et 
al., 2005; Noble and Storey, 2005; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004; Morrison-Saunders et al., 
2003). In this regard, follow-up is the link between project development and environmental 
management (Arts et al., 2001); it enables “…practitioners and stakeholders to move from a 
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mainly theoretical perspective on a proposal to [an] actual understanding and knowing the real 
situation once projects are implemented” (Morrison-Saunders, 2004: 3).   
In today’s heavily regulated industrial environment, follow-up in EIA is no longer an 
option but a sound precaution and proactive measure (Marshall, 2005). As such, the roles and 
stakes of follow-up have changed considerably. In the past, follow-up primarily concentrated on 
verifying the accuracy of biophysical impact predictions and monitoring biophysical change in 
the local project environment, and occurred primarily within the context of the proponent and 
enforced by the regulator (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005).  Emerging literature and 
discussions amongst the international EIA community, however, now suggest that the focus of 
follow-up is shifting from that of solely monitoring and evaluating biophysical impact 
predictions towards linking up with environmental management, and more recently 
communicating about environmental performance with stakeholders and the community (e.g. 
Lawe et al., 2005; Marshall, 2005; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005; Noble and Storey, 2005). 
In doing so, greater importance and interest is being placed on actively engaging community 
stakeholders and the affected publics in EIA follow-up programs directly.  
That said, and notwithstanding the proliferation of international literature and case studies 
dedicated to post-decision follow-up activities, little empirical evidence exists to support the 
changing roles and scope of EIA follow-up. This is particularly the case in northern Canada, 
where follow-up and EIA itself have been given only limited attention (see Noble and Bronson, 
2006; Mulvihill and Baker, 2001). As Canada is about to embark on a number of major mineral 
and energy resource development projects in its northern regions, understanding how follow-up 
has evolved and the current roles and stakes in follow-up and impact management processes is 
essential to ensuring meaningful project planning, implementation and feedback.  While 
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communication and cooperative environmental decision-making are now recognized as 
important elements in the Canadian northern development context, effective implementation and 
integration of these concepts continue to challenge EIA - particularly at the follow-up stage (see 
Noble, 2006; Noble and Bronson, 2006; Veiga, 2001).  
Based on a case study of follow-up in northern Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry, 
this paper examines the institutional development of EIA follow-up and its changing roles and 
stakes.  The current state of follow-up in Saskatchewan’s uranium industry is a mixed model of 
regulator-driven follow-up combined with industry-led initiatives and private industry-
community follow-up agreements and programs.  In this paper, influential developments in the 
emergence and evolution of follow-up in the uranium industry since the 1930s are examined, 
thus providing a better understanding of current regulatory procedures, processes, and follow-up 
practices and agreements. Emerging follow-up trends, including the roles and relationships of 
communities and stakeholders, are also examined. In doing so, this paper attempts to contribute 
to the current knowledge and understanding of the evolution and present state of follow-up 
programs and practices.   
The paper begins with a brief discussion of follow-up in the EIA process, followed by an 
overview of the uranium industry. Attention then turns to the nature and evolution of follow-up 
in the industry. The paper concludes with observations concerning the discontinuity and future of 
follow-up systems, and the implications of increasing privatized follow-up programs.  
 
2.2 Follow-up Roles and Stakes 
 
Prior to 2000, follow-up was not extensively examined in the academic literature or carried out 
in practice. Recently, however, in recognition of the importance of follow-up in ensuring 
environmental protection and in fostering the sustainable development of the environment, the 
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subject has been the center of several special sessions at the annual meeting of the International 
Association for Impact Assessment, and the focus of a 2005 special issue of Impact Assessment 
and Project Appraisal. In the Canadian context, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency’s Research and Development program priorities has included the need to improve the 
effectiveness of EIA follow-up since the program’s inception eight years ago, and follow-up is 
now a requirement under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. 
Broadly speaking, follow-up can be defined as the monitoring and evaluation of the 
impacts of a project or plan that has been subject to EIA, for management of, and communication 
about, the environmental performance of that project or plan (Marshall et al., 2005; Morrison-
Saunders and Arts, 2004). Follow-up is often utilized as an umbrella term for the various 
activities undertaken during the post-decision stage of a project and is comprised of four main 
elements (Marshall et al., 2005; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004; Arts et al., 2001), namely:  
 
Monitoring: the collection of data and comparison with standards, predictions or 
expectations. It includes baseline monitoring, monitoring of compliance with, and 
effects of, the consent decision, and area-wide monitoring. 
 
Evaluation: the appraisal of the conformance with standards, predictions or 
expectations as well as the environmental performance of the activity. It is utilized in 
planning and policy for the generic process of gathering, structuring, analysing, and 
appraising information. Evaluation explicitly involves value-judgements and often 
relates to subjective policy-orientated judgements opposed to purely scientific and 
technical analysis.   
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Management: making decisions and taking appropriate actions in response to issues 
arising from monitoring and evaluation activities. Ongoing management decisions 
may be made by both proponents (e.g., responding to unexpected impacts) and by 
EIA regulators (e.g., reviewing consent conditions and management requirements) 
alike.  
 
Communication: informing the stakeholders and the general public about the results 
of EIA follow-up. Both proponents and EIA regulators may engage in 
communication programmes. Some follow-up programmes extend beyond 
monitoring to include also direct stakeholder participation in the monitoring, 
evaluation, and management process. Such activities may be facilitated through 
follow-up under Environmental Agreements. 
 
Follow-up is fundamental to the entire EIA process.  Although pre-decision analysis is 
typically the focus of EIA, it alone is not sufficient for sound environmental decision-making 
(Noble and Macharia, 2004). According to Morrison-Saunders and Arts (2005), an underlying 
purpose of EIA follow-up is to ensure that project management occurred and occurs effectively 
with minimum adverse or residual environmental effects.  In other words, follow-up encourages 
integration of environmental perspectives into developmental programmes, it promotes the 
systematic implementation of mitigation, and it triggers environmental risk responses put forth 
by development activities (Marshall, 2005). In addition, Marshall (2005) notes that successful 
development is increasingly being viewed in terms of its final result - its operational 
environmental performance and the actual environmental impacts that have taken place. 
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Three principle parties or stakeholders are generally involved in follow-up activities (see 
Marshall et al., 2005; Arts et al., 2001), namely the: 
 
Proponent - private companies or governmental organizations that develop a 
project, they are often expected to perform most follow-up activities 
 
EIA Regulator - competent authorities or a government agency responsible for 
administrating or implementing EIA systems; and 
 
Community - the body of public or other independent persons directly affected by 
a proposal or interested persons. The extent of public involvement may range 
from direct community involvement in follow-up programs to simply being kept 
informed of follow-up activities and outcomes. 
 
However, each application of follow-up is undertaken for a particular purpose and the associated 
outcomes of a follow-up program may provide different benefits to each of the parties involved 
(see Marshall, 2005). For example, benefits to the proponents may include reduced liability 
concerning unanticipated environmental outcomes and enhancing a community’s acceptance of a 
development project by providing a ‘greener’ corporate image. For communities, follow-up may 
provide an opportunity to learn about a project and the local environment and reduce feelings of 
uncertainty concerning a project’s environmental effects. For regulators, follow-up is a means to 
ensure that projects are performing as intended and that regulatory standards and requirements 
are being met.  
Emerging trends in the academic literature point toward a shift or change in the theory, 
nature and role of EIA follow-up (Figure 2.1). Morrison-Saunders and Arts (2005) maintain that 
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the direction of follow-up is towards an increasing role in environmental management, an 
increase in overall involvement and communication amongst all stakeholders, and a process that 
is more community-focussed. This is in sharp contrast to the type of follow-up that persisted 
throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s, where attention was largely focused on verifying 
biophysical impact predictions and on biophysical effects monitoring, with the primary parties 
involved being the project proponent and the regulator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Evolving trends in EIA Follow-up  
Source: Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005: 173 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic issues now have a much larger presence in follow-up monitoring 
programs, focusing on areas such as employment, education, and potential revenue-sharing from 
development projects (Storey and Noble, 2005). Attention has also turned more toward impact 
management as opposed to verifying impact predictions (Noble and Storey, 2005).  Parsons and 
Barsi (2001) further suggest that industry is now playing more of a leading role in follow-up 
activities, while regulators are regarded as taking a step back. According to Veiga et al. (2001: 
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191), this is simply a reflection of the current reality of doing business in communities, and 
proponents “…must now pursue their interests in a way that also promotes those of the local 
communities in regions where they are operating”.  
 
2.3 Case Study: Saskatchewan’s Uranium Mining Industry 
 
The Athabasca Basin of northern Saskatchewan (Figure 2.2) has been the focus of the province’s 
uranium mining industry since pitchblende, an oxide of uranium, was discovered on the northern 
shore of Lake Athabasca in the 1930s (Wiles et al., 1999).  Occupying nearly one third of the 
surface area of the Saskatchewan Shield (100,000 square kilometres), the northern Athabasca 
region is one of the world’s most important sources of uranium, holding many high-grade 
uranium deposits and accounting for approximately 25% of world’s total uranium output (WNA, 
2008; GOS, 2007; Card et al., 2006). Over the last three decades in particular uranium has been 
an important Canadian energy resource, used in nuclear power reactors, providing 15% of 
Canada’s electricity supply (SMA, 2007). As the demand for uranium continues to increase 
internationally, production from northern Saskatchewan uranium mines continues to rise.  
The province’s uranium mines are primarily owned and operated by Cameco Corporation 
and Areva Resources Canada, with McLean Lake, Key Lake/ McArthur River, and Rabbit Lake 
being the three main uranium mines currently operating in northern Saskatchewan. In 2007, a 
total of 9,465 tonnes of uranium (24.6 million pounds of U3O8) was produced by Saskatchewan 
mines via underground, open pit, and stockpile mining (Table 2.1).  
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 Figure 2.2 – Main Uranium Mining Operations in the Athabasca Basin 
Source: Map produced by Keith Bigelow, University of Saskatchewan  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 – Northern Saskatchewan Uranium Production for 2007 
Operating Mine Tonnes of Uranium Million Pounds of U3O8
McLean Lake 734 1.9 
Key Lake/McArthur River 7,193 18.7 
Rabbit Lake 1,538 4.0 
TOTAL 9,465 24.6 
Source: Areva, 2008; Cameco, 2008;  SMA, 2007a. 
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A proponent in the uranium mining industry in Saskatchewan must meet regulatory 
requirements and permitting processes as set forth by both federal and provincial governments. 
Federally, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) regulates the uranium industry 
with federal regulatory inputs from Environment Canada, the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRDSC), and Transport Canada. 
Provincially, the Ministry of Environment is the primary regulatory authority, with input from 
the Ministry of Advanced Education, Employment and Labour, Ministry of Energy and 
Resources, and the Ministry of First Nations and Métis Relations. A licence from the CNSC is 
required by any proponent prior to any mining related activity, ranging from site preparation to 
decommissioning and from transporting to storing nuclear substances (CNSC, 2007).  Prior to 
any licence being granted, an EIA must be carried out. EIA for site preparation, development, 
and decommissioning is under the jurisdiction of both the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act and the Saskatchewan Environmental Assessment Act. If a positive decision is reached 
regarding the application, the various licences are then issued for the proposed activity (Figure 
2.3) (CNSC, 2007).    
A total of 38 impact assessments have been completed in the Athabasca region to date, the 
first of which was the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry in the late 1970s.  Since the early exploration 
activities of the 1930s, however, regulatory procedures, frameworks, priorities and practices for 
uranium development and impact assessment have undergone a number of evolutionary changes 
– changes that have led to the development and nature of the industry’s current impact 
management and follow-up program, and changes that have heavily influenced follow-up roles 
and stakes.  In the sections that follow, this evolution of the uranium industry is discussed and 
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the main influences on the development of follow-up and on its changing roles and stakes are 
explored. 
Figure 2.3 – Licensing Process for a New Uranium Mine or Mill in Canada (Decommissioning Phase not shown) 
Source: CNSC, 2007: 15 
 
2.3.1 Methods 
 
Two primary methods were used to carry out this research, namely document reviews and semi-
structured interviews. Document review broadly refers to the various procedures involved in 
analyzing and interpreting data generated from the examination of documents and records 
relevant to a particular study (Schwandt, 2007). When applied, document reviews are an 
unintrusive form of research with minimal, if any, impact on the research setting (Babbie, 2002). 
The document review method has several strengths including a straightforward approach where a 
researcher accesses the appropriate documents and applies or categorizes the information 
according to a predetermined conceptual framework. The process is useful for studying a wide 
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variety of communications; it allows a researcher to study processes over a time period, and 
given the static nature of the research setting results may be verified (or not) by other 
investigators (Babbie, 2002; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Babbie 1992).   For the current study, 
documents were collected from October 2007 to June 2008 and included uranium mining 
reports; Cameco records, articles, and files (e.g. Northern Saskatchewan’s Environmental 
Quality Committee Report to Communities, 2002-2003; Northern Saskatchewan Community 
Vitality Monitoring Annual Report, 2003); the Environmental Agreement established between 
Cameco, Areva, and the Athabasca Working Group (AWG); AWG Annual Reports; and research 
on environmental assessment documents that have been implemented to date.  These documents 
were utilized to identify and characterize the various regulatory requirements for impact 
assessment and industry management, and hence follow-up, and to examine the various roles and 
stakes involved. The chronology of industry development reported here draws largely on the 
work of Parsons and Barsi (2001; 2000). 
Document reviews were supplemented and verified with semi-structured interviews in 
order to fill any gaps in understanding of the regulatory framework and follow-up practices that 
document reviews were unable to bridge effectively (see Creswell 2003). Interviews also 
allowed for an opportunity to explore where potential differences of opinion and experiences 
may exist, and where there is general consensus on the issues (see Dunn, 2000). The semi-
structured approach facilitated a more natural conversation and accommodated change in the 
presentation of questions to ensure specific themes could be fully explored and developed 
(Flowerdew and Martin, 2005; Dunn, 2000).  Concomitantly, it allowed for structure in the 
organization and categorization of information based on a predetermined framework of 
evaluation. Interviews were conducted over the course of six months, from February to August 
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2008. Twelve interviews were conducted with various uranium mining representatives from 
Cameco and Areva, as well as federal and provincial government regulators, and environmental 
consultants.  At a preliminary meeting with Cameco Corporation’s Environmental Affairs group, 
it was established that the initial identification of industry participants would be done with the 
assistance of the Cameco Corporation.  Remaining interviewees were identified using a 
purposeful sampling procedure by seeking out industry representatives, regulators, and 
environmental consultants in positions who were likely to have in-depth knowledge of EIA and 
the uranium industry, and then using a ‘snowballing’ technique (see Mason, 2002; Bryman, 
2001).  
Interviews were requested by email and telephone invitation wherein a brief research 
summary was provided.  Interviews ranged from half an hour to two hours in duration, aiming to 
gather qualitative data to supplement the information obtained from documents and to provide 
knowledge from an industry, government, and environmental consultants’ perspective.  
Interviews also provided an opportunity for more in-depth inquiry to specific aspects of follow-
up, including how data are being used in management and follow-up practices.  Ten of the 
interviews were carried out in-person, whereas two were telephone-based due to scheduling 
difficulty. Interviews conducted in person took place at the participant’s place of business and 
were scheduled according to the interviewee’s availability. It was apparent that an adequate 
number of industry representatives, regulators, and other industry players had been contacted and 
interviewed when participant names, themes and comments began to repeat.  Question areas 
included how EIA follow-up roles and responsibilities had changed over time; whether follow-up 
activity had increased in recent years and, if so, in what capacity; and whether a change in the 
balance of roles between industry and government had occurred.  
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With consent, all interviews were audio taped and then transcribed. Interviews were 
analyzed with the assistance of Atlas.ti © software whereby each interview was classified into 
themes and then assigned different codes to interpret the data.  By coding the data, interpretation 
of information and linking relationships or concepts together was done effectively. In addition, 
Atlas.ti made the retrieval and the overall organization of data a much more efficient process.  
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
The current system and evolution of follow-up roles and stakes in Saskatchewan’s uranium 
industry was influenced by a number of significant developments and shifts in the regulatory, 
community, and industry environment (Table 2.2). These shifts, or eras of development, can be 
categorized into four influential periods. The first is a period of initial discovery, marked by the 
development of the uranium industry and its associated regulatory framework; the second is 
framed around the emergence of public inquiries as an underlying component of impact 
assessment; the third era is characterized by the development of a ‘tripartite framework’; and the 
fourth and current era is one of emerging private partnerships between the industry and 
communities. This classification is not to suggest a clear and natural evolution of EIA follow-up 
to its present form.  Rather, to adopt a characterization of economic geography developed by 
Trevor Barnes (1997), the evolution is perhaps best described as discontinuity: the displacement 
of one body of knowledge giving way to another; the discontinuity of unnatural breaks; and the 
disruption of a previously established order.  
In the sections that follow, the evolution of the industry and a number of influential 
developments that shaped the nature and current form of EIA follow-up in Saskatchewan’s 
uranium industry are discussed. So as to ensure the confidentiality of interview participants, only 
aggregate or summary results of the interviews are presented. In other cases, the participants’ 
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general affiliation (e.g. industry, regulator, consultant) is identified but the names of specific 
companies or government units are withheld. 
 
 
Table 2.2 - Evolution of the Saskatchewan Uranium Industry and Environmental Impact Assessment Follow-
up 
 
 
Era 
 
Industry Development 
 
Follow-up Framework 
 
 
 
Period of  
Initial Discovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 Uranium discovered on the north shore of Lake 
Athabasca (1934-1935) 
 Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited as a Crown 
Corporation (1943) 
 Atomic Energy Control Act is passed and the Atomic 
Energy Control Board established (1946) 
 Uranium is discovered at Rabbit Lake (1968) 
 
 Pre-formal EIA in Canada, 
characterized by a newly 
developing regulatory process 
alongside industry development. 
 No system or provisions for 
follow-up and monitoring 
activities of the effects of uranium 
exploration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Era of 
Public Inquiries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Uranium deposits discovered at Cluff Lake (1971) 
 Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation created 
as a provincial Crown Corporation to govern all mining 
in the province (1974) 
 Uranium is discovered at Key Lake (1975) 
 Environmental Assessment and Safety Report submitted 
to Saskatchewan government for the development of 
uranium operations near Cluff Lake (1976) 
 Cluff Lake public inquiry process explores the probable 
environmental, health, safety, social, and economic 
effects of Saskatchewan uranium mining industry (1977) 
 Key Lake Board of Inquiry is established to review and 
make recommendation on the Key Lake project (1979) 
 Environmental assessment and regulatory program 
formally enacted in Saskatchewan (1980) 
 Surface leases introduced and implemented to adopt 
cooperative practices in enhancing a positive economy 
in northern communities (early to mid-1980s) 
 Key Lake begins production (1982) 
 Human Resource Development Agreements (HRDA) 
introduced into Surface leases to maximize recruitment, 
hiring, training in northern Saskatchewan (1986) 
 Uranium discoveries are made and development projects 
(e.g. Rabbit Lake Extension, Cigar Lake, McArthur 
River) proposed by private mining companies (1987) 
 Cameco Corporation is formed (1988) 
 Joint Federal-Provincial Environmental Impact 
Assessment Panel on Uranium Mining appointed to 
examine the environmental, health, and socio-economic 
effects of proposed uranium developments (1991)  
 
 Formal EIA processes are 
introduced at the federal and 
provincial level 
 Follow-up regulatory requirements 
are introduced, but monitoring is 
focused predominantly on 
biophysical effects monitoring by 
industry and regulated by 
government.  
 Increasing awareness of the social, 
and economic issues of northern 
communities affected by uranium 
mining.   
 Public inquiries emerge as a 
foundation of the impact 
assessment regulatory process, but 
social and economic concerns 
remain largely absent from 
industry and government follow-
up and monitoring activities and 
requirements 
 The beginning of a mixed model 
of roles and stakes in uranium 
development that would transform 
responsibilities and future 
relationships in development 
impact management and follow-up 
programs. 
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Establishment  
of a Tripartite 
System 
 
• Athabasca Working Group is created by Cameco in 
response to recommendations of the Joint Panel, 
representing the seven northern Athabascan 
communities and two uranium companies (1993) 
• Three Environmental Quality Committees (EQCs) are 
established in response to Joint Panel recommendations 
by the provincial government, and designed to address 
the need for northern participation in uranium mining 
regulation (1995) 
• Community Vitality Monitoring Partnership Process 
(CVMPP) established in response to recommendations 
from the Joint Panel and revised surface leases (1998) 
 
 
 A tripartite framework of 
government, industry, and 
communities in impact 
management and follow-up 
programs emerge. 
 Shifting emphasis toward 
community involvement and 
consideration of social issues in 
uranium mining regulatory 
processes, including follow-up. 
 Role of industry becomes more 
prominent in follow-up due to 
increased positions on 
environmental leadership and 
corporate-social responsibility.   
 
 
 
 
Development of 
Private 
Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
• A comprehensive impact management agreement is 
signed between Cameco, Areva, and the AWG focusing 
on three major areas: employment; training and business 
development; benefit sharing; and environmental 
protection (1999) 
• A community-based environmental monitoring program 
is established under the AWG to monitor ‘off-site’ 
uranium mining impacts (2000) 
 
 A private community-industry 
agreement adds a parallel follow-
up and impact management 
framework to the existing public 
regulatory process 
 Communities become actively 
engaged in industry environmental 
monitoring and reporting. 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Compiled based on interview participants; Cameco, 2007; GOS, 2007; Kneen, 2006; Parsons and Barsi, 2001; 
2000; Goulet, 1997;  JFPP, 1992. 
 
 
2.4.1 Period of Initial Discovery 
 
In 1935, uranium deposits were discovered at Goldfields in the Beaverlodge area, north of Lake 
Athabasca. Due to the onset of World War II, the Canadian government imposed a ban on 
private exploration for uranium and created Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited1 to control 
all uranium-related exploration activities (ES, 2005; Parsons and Barsi, 2000). Extensive 
prospecting in the Beaverlodge area began in 1944, and eight years later Uranium City was 
established and production mining began in 1953 (Kneen, 2006; Parsons and Barsi, 2001). Three 
separate mining facilities and 16 ore bodies were developed in the Uranium City area. The first 
                                                 
1 In 1968, Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited changed its name to Eldorado Nuclear Limited. 
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major uranium deposit in the Athabasca region was discovered at Rabbit Lake in 1968 – now the 
province’s oldest operating uranium mining and milling facility. 
The Atomic Energy Control Act was passed in the House of Commons to regulate all 
operations of the industry, and the Atomic Energy Control Board was set-up to administer the 
Act in 1946 (Kneen, 2006; Parsons and Barsi, 2001); however, uranium discoveries, milling, and 
mining were new to both governments and there was no structured impact assessment or 
regulatory process that existed in northern Saskatchewan or in Canada prior to the 1970s. 
Proactive environmental management in the industry, including environmental assessment, was 
non-existent during this period of initial discovery. According to Parsons and Barsi (2001), 
“limited attention was paid to workers’ occupational health and safety, less to environmental 
protection, and no attention at all to reclamation, communities, or socioeconomic performance”. 
Environmental regulations for uranium mining emerged alongside the development of the 
industry itself, and in the years that would follow the provincial government attempted to address 
the environmental aspects of uranium mining, as well as the economic and social disparities of 
northern Saskatchewan residents and communities through greater involvement in mining 
regulation (Parsons and Barsi, 2001; JFPP, 1992). At both the federal and provincial level, the 
evolution and development of an environmental assessment and regulatory process for the 
uranium industry began to emerge.  
 
 
2.4.2 Era of Public Inquiries  
 
In 1971, high grade uranium deposits were discovered in the Carswell formation near Cluff Lake 
in the Athabasca Basin. Five years later, an Environmental Assessment and Safety Report for the 
development of a uranium mining and milling operation near Cluff Lake was submitted to the 
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Government of Saskatchewan by Amok Limited (Goulet, 1997; JFPP, 1992).  Shortly after, a 
public inquiry, the Bayda Commission Cluff lake Board of Inquiry, was commissioned to review 
the proposed development and to assess the potential environmental, health, safety, social, and 
economic effects of the overall future expansion of uranium development in Saskatchewan.  
The Bayda Inquiry began in April 1977, involved formal hearings lasting 67 days, and 
included approximately 138 witnesses (Goulet, 1997). Recommendations from the inquiry 
included socio-economic improvements to current northern employment and business 
opportunities associated with the Cluff Lake project, and a recommendation that the province 
develop a structure that would ensure future uranium mining generated revenues were more 
directly shared with northern people. The Cluff Lake project was approved, but was subject to 
increased regulation and recommendations to clarify federal and provincial jurisdiction over the 
environment (Parsons and Barsi, 2001).  Cluff Lake commenced production in 1980. The Bayda 
Inquiry was a significant event in the history in Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry; it 
would extend the scope of future mine assessments to include, in addition to biological and other 
environmental considerations (Parsons and Parsi, 2001), such issues as worker health and safety; 
social, economic, community and northern benefits; disposal of nuclear wastes; and moral and 
ethical issues about northern uranium mining. 
As the Cluff Lake project was unfolding, major uranium deposits were also detected in the 
nearby Key Lake area in 1975.  The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the development 
of the Key Lake mine and mill was submitted to the provincial government for approval in 1979. 
Similar to the Cluff Lake development, the Government of Saskatchewan recommended an 
inquiry to review and make recommendations on the Key Lake project. All activities associated 
with the Key Lake Board of Inquiry occurred in the northern communities of the Athabasca 
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region, with the exception of an additional 55 information centres established throughout the 
province (Goulet, 1997).  Emphasis was again placed on the need for government and industry to 
ensure training, employment, and business opportunities for the northern population; 
additionally, the potential impact of the Key Lake proposal on northern communities and people 
was also addressed (Goulet, 1997; JFPP, 1992). Like Cluff Lake, the Key Lake project was 
approved. Production began in 1982. 
According to Goulet (1997), recommendations from both inquiries supported provincial 
government initiatives to ensure northern residents would benefit in a meaningful way from 
uranium development. For example, tools such as “surface leases” were introduced and 
implemented; these leases were intended to adopt cooperative practices in enhancing a positive 
economy in northern communities (Parsons and Barsi, 2001). In addition, significant 
requirements to increase northern employment and participation in uranium mining activities 
were introduced. An additional three major public inquiries concerning uranium development in 
the Athabasca region were commissioned in the years that followed.  
2.4.2.1 Emergence of a regulatory-based follow-up framework 
Throughout the 1970s the provincial government became increasingly involved in the regulation 
of mining activities, with an objective to address the increasing concern regarding social and 
economic disparities of northern Saskatchewan communities and First Nations groups that were 
long-standing but not addressed (Parsons and Barsi, 2001; Goulet, 1997). The Saskatchewan 
Mining Development Corporation was created as a provincial crown corporation in 1974 to 
govern all mining in the province (e.g. exploring, developing, storing, and selling) (ES, 2005) 
and to meet the province’s mandate of improving the social and economic conditions in the north 
(Parsons and Barsi, 2001).  
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It was also during this time, in 1973, that Canada formally introduced the EIA process, the 
Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, giving rise to the development of 
follow-up and monitoring programs.  There was general consensus amongst interview 
participants that once the EIA process was implemented, the importance of follow-up, its role, 
and how it was to be conducted in uranium development projects was soon recognized.  One 
interviewee from industry commented that the specific legislative changes that were brought 
forth from the 1970s and implemented in the 1980s produced a new generation of mining 
operations and standards, thus developing and maturing follow-up procedures.  Another 
participant, also from industry, identified Uranium City as an example of the changes in follow-
up priorities and roles during this period; in the 1960s industry did not conduct routine 
monitoring of sites, but years later, following the emergence of public inquiries and introduction 
of the EIA process, reclamation and environmental programs became commonplace at Uranium 
City.  
In the early 1980s, the Saskatchewan government introduced its own comprehensive 
environmental assessment and regulatory/enforcement program to specifically address the 
environmental and human health concerns associated with uranium development. This entailed 
the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies to provide clear and 
reasonable boundary conditions for uranium proponents.  In addition, the implementation of a 
formal provincial environmental assessment review process, The Saskatchewan Environmental 
Assessment Act, resulted in a further increase in community consultation and involvement in 
northern development (Parsons and Barsi, 2001). Under this new provincial system, proponents 
were required to prepare an EIS detailing their assessment and management plans for all aspects 
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of a project, including decommission and abandonment, and to provide a specific outline to be 
used for mitigating any environmental disturbances – ecological, social, or economic. 
In 1986, the Human Resource Development Agreement (HRDA) was introduced into 
surface leases. A co-operative approach between mining companies and government, HRDAs 
were designed to maximize recruitment, hiring, training, and advancement of northern people at 
all skill levels in northern Saskatchewan mining operations (Parsons and Barsi, 2001; Goulet, 
1997). This approach reflected a cooperative planning and training process, providing long-term 
commitments by government, industry, and community to increase northern employment levels 
(Parsons and Barsi, 2001).  
In 1988, the federal and provincial governments merged and privatized their respective 
uranium mining companies, Eldorado Resources Limited and the Saskatchewan Mining 
Development Corporation, to form the Cameco Corporation. This merger led to a new period of 
private-sector uranium mine development and operation (Parsons and Barsi, 2001), which 
subsequently led to greater regulation by the provincial government with a smaller federal role in 
the mining process (Parsons and Barsi, 2001). Overall, the regulatory framework of the 1970s 
and 1980s reflects an increase in awareness of northern environmental, social, and economic 
issues; a reflection of the use of public inquiries as the primary means to identify and assess 
these issues. Concomitantly, with the privatization of Eldorado Resources and the Saskatchewan 
Mining Development Corporation, industry’s role in uranium mining began to increase; 
however, industry was expected to share the social and environmental priorities of the provincial 
government (Goulet, 1997).   
Although community and public views were largely considered, evaluated, and 
incorporated into the regulatory process during this era, such issues had not yet been carried 
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forward to the post-decision stages of follow-up and evaluation (Noble and Storey, 2005).  In 
practice, the follow-up system that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s with the introduction of the 
Canadian federal and Saskatchewan provincial environmental assessment requirements and 
various industry regulations and agreements was primarily based on compliance monitoring and 
focused heavily on biophysical effects monitoring in the local project environment – carried out 
by industry and regulated by government. Changing regulatory roles and responsibilities, 
however, alongside increased public involvement and demands on and expectations of the 
industry to deliver benefits to northern communities, marked the beginning of a mixed model of 
roles and stakes in uranium development and subsequent follow-up and monitoring programs. 
2.4.3 Establishment of a Tripartite System  
 
In 1987, after years of exploration and operations in the Rabbit Lake area, additional radioactive 
occurrences were detected and several uranium development opportunities were identified by 
private companies (i.e. Cameco and Cogema2) (Noble and Bronson, 2004). Heavily influenced 
by several years of public inquiry concerning the environmental and socio-economic 
implications of mining for northern communities (see Kneen, 2006; Parsons and Barsi, 2001), 
and in light of the changing roles of government and industry in the development of the mining 
sector, a new ‘tripartite framework’ emerged that encompassed government, industry, and 
communities in industry regulation, impact management, and follow-up (Table 2.3). 
In 1991, in response to three new uranium mine proposals (Cigar Lake, McArthur River, 
and Rabbit Lake - Eagle Point Extension), the federal and provincial governments combined 
efforts under the authority of their respective environmental legislations to establish a Joint 
Federal-Provincial Environmental Impact Assessment Panel on Uranium Mining Developments 
                                                 
2 The Cogema Company is now under the name Areva Resources Canada. 
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in Northern Saskatchewan (Joint Panel). The Joint Panel had two specific goals: to determine 
whether the proposed projects were acceptable; and to provide full opportunities for public 
consultation and review. 
 
Table 2.3 – Key Players in Saskatchewan Uranium Mining Industry 
Government 
Federal Provincial 
Industry Community 
Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission (CNSC) 
Ministry of Environment Areva Resources 
Incorporation 
Stakeholders: First Nation 
Groups, Athabasca and Northern 
communities, General Public 
Environment Canada Ministry of Advanced 
Education, Employment 
and Labour 
Cameco 
Corporation 
Non-government organizations 
Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
Ministry of First Nations 
and  Métis Relations 
  
Source: Compiled based on interview responses 
 
For seven years the Joint Panel examined the cumulative effects of the proposed projects 
on the Northern Saskatchewan environment, communities, and people.  The final report of the 
Joint Panel, issued in 1998, noted that the majority of public consultations encompassed matters 
of community benefits and other social and economic concerns rather than environmental ones.  
In particular, many communities and First Nations groups wanted to participate in – and to 
receive benefits from – uranium mining activities (Parsons and Barsi, 2001). The Joint Panel 
further noted that although monitoring requirements were in place that met regulatory 
requirements and that biophysical data collection was ongoing, there were ongoing concerns 
about the quality of monitoring data and its effectiveness in determining mining impacts. For 
example, Noble and Bronson (2004) report that despite more than a decade of biophysical 
environmental monitoring, there were limited “…comparable, consistent data to establish the 
actual [cumulative] impacts of mining operations and radionuclide effects on fish; an exposure of 
considerable implications for human health”.  The Joint Panel concluded that the existing 
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environmental protection program was inadequate to deal with the potential issues emerging 
from further uranium development.  
Recommendations of the Joint Panel led government to make significant changes in its 
regulatory framework for uranium mining. In order to address regional and community benefits 
for northern involvement in uranium development, the Joint Panel made major recommendations 
on procurement, education, protection, waste disposal, decommission, monitoring, roads, and 
worker safety (Lee, 1997).  Recommendations were also made regarding improvements to 
existing environmental programs including consultation; ecosystem based monitoring utilizing 
valued ecosystem components; cumulative effects assessment; increased emphasis on site 
decommissioning to ensure proper closeout and environmental mitigation; and community 
participation in environmental monitoring.  Two significant developments that emerged from the 
Joint Panel’s recommendations were the formation of Environmental Quality Committees (EQC) 
and the Community Vitality Monitoring Partnership Process (CVMPP). 
 
Environmental Quality Committees: To address the need for northern public participation in 
uranium mining regulation, the provincial government established three regional EQCs in 1995 
(EQC, 2003). These EQCs were intended to help bridge the knowledge and information sharing 
gap between northerners, government, and industry (Cameco, 2007; EQC, 2003). In addition, the 
EQCs were designed to ensure that uranium mining activities take place in ways that consider 
the needs and aspirations of northern residents (Cameco, 2007; EQC, 2003).  Each EQC was to 
consist of representatives from the affected communities as designated in each uranium mine’s 
HRDA; individual members are nominated by their community to represent their concerns 
associated with uranium mining development. The activities of EQCs are supported by 
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professionals from the provincial government’s Northern Mines Monitoring Secretariat. The 
EQCs serve as a “public consultation interface” between proponents and the community and, in 
doing so, have made a significant contribution to addressing issues of concern to northern 
communities and facilitating communication between the two groups (EQC, 2003; Goulet, 
1997).  
The Community Vitality Monitoring Partnership Process (CVMPP): Formed in 1998, the 
CVMPP focuses on monitoring and evaluating the effects of uranium mining activity on the 
vitality (social well-being and quality of life) of northern Saskatchewan communities (CVMPP, 
2003). The CVMPP includes representatives from the Northern Mines Monitoring Secretariat, 
the northern regional health boards, the Northern Inter-Tribal Health Authority, Saskatchewan 
Health, and the two mining companies - Cameco and Areva (CVMPP, 2003). The first project of 
the CVMPP was completed in 2000, and focused on an out-migration study of the dynamics of 
northern residents relocating to southern urban communities. Since then, a number of projects 
have been completed regarding the availability of healthy foods in the north, youth initiative 
conferences, and youth workshops in attempt to promote positive life decisions (Cameco, 2007).  
2.4.3.1 Integrating community and communication in follow-up 
Through the recommendations of the Joint Panel, a tripartite framework emerged and various 
forms of follow-up procedures, committees, and processes began to take form throughout the 
1990s.  Of particular importance was the emphasis being placed on community involvement and 
incorporation of local communities in the uranium mining regulatory processes, including 
follow-up. Parsons and Barsi (2001) note that this framework specifically led to an increase in 
environmental regulation directly involving communities. 
 33
According to interviews with industry representatives, and confirmed by one of the 
province’s industry regulators, the uranium industry emerged in the 1990s playing a leading role 
in follow-up activities, and taking a more aggressive stance on follow-up and environmental 
protection than industry regulators. Interviewees from the consulting sector, familiar with the 
uranium industry and its impact assessment framework, similarly indicated that during the 1990s 
industry emerged with a much stronger role and stake in follow-up, and with a felt responsibility 
to report to the public and its shareholders on its operations and performance.  Interview 
participants also suggested that industry was taking greater initiative, being proactive, and 
exceeding expectations put forth by regulatory requirements  - not only because companies are 
largely susceptible to public opinion, but because of an overall awareness of corporate-social 
responsibility and increased position on environmental leadership.  That being said, two 
government officials shared the view that the balance of roles between industry and government 
have both significantly increased on each side, resulting in greater environmental protection and 
thus more overall attention to follow-up and monitoring.  One industry representative agreed, 
suggesting that “...it would be an over-statement to say that the industry is doing it [follow-up] 
on their own volition.  They want to be protective of the environment but without the regulatory 
drivers there...” it’s unclear whether the follow-up process would be done so comprehensively. 
Industry impact management documents and interviews with industry, government, and 
environmental consultants confirm that follow-up emerged in the 1990s from a largely 
biophysical-based monitoring program to one of greater public involvement in its process, 
addressing also social and community concerns.  Concomitantly, participants also expressed the 
view that follow-up in the uranium mining industry had become more community-oriented and 
community input, knowledge, and concerns are now regarded with value and importance when 
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compared follow-up and monitoring programs that characterized the 1980s. Consistent with 
Morrison-Saunders and Arts (2005), one interview participant said that follow-up and 
environmental monitoring had evolved into a process with a more “community-centric 
approach” – one with increased communication between community and industry and 
government. As Parsons and Barsi (2000: 29) suggest, “the regulatory approach towards northern 
Saskatchewan uranium mine development [has] evolved from a closed, largely federal approach 
with no public consultation...” to one where “today the system is a comprehensive tripartite long 
term planning approach that includes the federal and provincial governments, mining companies, 
Indian bands, and northern communities”.  
Interview participants attributed many benefits to the increased level of communication in 
follow-up, ranging from better relationships to better environmental protection.  For example, 
two industry participants specifically commented on the greater sense of trust which had 
developed among industry and the northern communities as a direct result of increased 
communication through follow-up programs. It was also mentioned that greater communication 
and community involvement has “...proven to be a very worthwhile learning experience and 
capacity-building exercise for northerners...” as it “...has allowed them to input to us [industry] 
what their real concerns are before the next project gets built”.  One industry participant 
indicated that a significant responsibility was placed upon industry to ensure that communities 
actually understood what potential impacts were associated with their geographical area in order 
to move forward with mining projects.  Thus, it had become important to not only increase 
communication with communities but to educate them about the possible adverse impacts of 
uranium mining operations and the strategies in place to manage them.  Through community 
meetings, programs, panels and groups, greater communication with and input from northern 
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communities was facilitated and enabled. Consequently, interviewees from industry and 
environmental consulting agencies felt that this has led to more meaningful monitoring and 
environmental protection whereby the concerns of the northern community are heard and 
accounted for in monitoring and impact management decision making. 
 
 
2.4.4 Development of Private Partnerships 
 
The Joint Panel of the 1990s increased follow-up awareness of northern Saskatchewan 
environmental, social, and economic issues.  At the same time, the private sector began to play a 
more prominent role in follow-up and impact management, replacing the original position held 
by government (see Goulet, 1997) and slowly resulting in a new institutional form of EIA 
follow-up – one based on private partnerships between the industry and community.  
Private partnerships between industry and northern communities are slowly becoming 
commonplace in the mining sector of northern Canada (see O’Faircheallaigh and Corbett, 2005). 
In the past, where follow-up had taken place, it had largely taken place at the regulator and the 
proponent level, with much less attention to actively engage communities in follow-up and 
monitoring activities (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005). According to Galbraith et al. (2007), a 
primary reason for the lack of community involvement is the nature of EIA process itself - it fails 
to adequately provide project-specific follow-up, consider community benefits, or build trust and 
capacity amongst community stakeholders. As a result, new agreements have been introduced 
and implemented, outside the public domain of EIA, in order to account for these deficiencies 
and to supplement existing follow-up frameworks and practices.   
In 1993 the Athabasca Working Group (AWG) was created by Cameco and Areva 
Resources in response to recommendations of the Joint Panel.  The AWG represents the 
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communities of the Athabasca Basin, namely: Black Lake Denesuline Nation, Fond du Lac 
Denesuline, and Hatchet Lake Denesuline along with the northern settlements of Camsell 
Portage, Uranium City and Wollaston Lake and the northern Hamlet of Stony Rapids (AWG, 
2004). The uranium mining companies represented on the AWG are Cameco and Areva.  The 
AWG is part of a larger context of northern community relations (e.g. scholarships and training 
programs) undertaken by the uranium mining industry (AWG, 2006). According to interviews 
with industry representatives, the AWG was established to facilitate communication between the 
industry and community and address the concerns of Athabasca communities about the impacts 
of mining while building relationships and a sense of trust between both groups. Following 
negotiations with the AWG in June 1999, a comprehensive Impact Management Agreement 
(IMA) was signed between Cameco, Areva, and the AWG communities, which focused on three 
major areas: employment, training and business development; benefit sharing; and 
environmental protection (Cameco 2007a; AWG, 2004). 
2.4.4.1 Privatized follow-up framework 
A community-based environmental monitoring program was established under the AWG in 2000 
to monitor the ‘off-site’ impacts of uranium mining operations with regard to air quality, water, 
lake sediments, fish, plants, and wildlife within the vicinity of the northern communities.    
Industry interviewees suggested this follow-up program provided local communities with 
reassurance in two ways: no uranium mining effects were occurring in this region, and in the 
event that any impact should occur compensation would be provided.  The program was 
implemented to monitor and document potential changes in the environment as a result of 
uranium production (AWG, 2006).  
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According to Cameco, Areva, and the EQC, this environmental monitoring program is best 
described as “comfort monitoring” where the industry hires a consultant who partners with a 
northern community representative to monitor industry effects. Comfort monitoring was 
introduced to the northern Athabasca Basin as a scientific approach to alleviate non-scientific 
(community) concerns, while providing communities with a sense of ownership and the 
opportunity for technology transfer.  All costs for the AWG process are sponsored by the mining 
companies (Cameco, 2007a; AWG, 2004).  The program is currently in its 9th year.  
The environmental monitoring under the AWG and IMA program emphasizes community 
involvement and includes training community representatives to collect samples to monitor 
baseline environmental indicators. The community is responsible for both appointing 
representatives to the program and for selecting local people to participate in environmental 
monitoring (AWG, 2004; 2006). Environmental monitoring data are collected in the spring 
(June) and fall (September) and include data pertaining to air quality (radon gas), water quality, 
lake sediment, vegetation, and wildlife (Cameco, 2007a; AWG, 2006; 2004).  AWG members 
provide assistance in identifying specific monitoring locations near communities, and local 
communities and indigenous groups facilitate in the collection of environmental data utilized for 
follow-up and post-impact management processes and oversee testing by independent 
consultants (Cameco, 2007a; AWG, 2006; 2004). Results of the monitoring program are 
communicated and reported back to the communities. According to Cameco (2007b) and the 
AWG Annual Report (2006; 2004), no off-site, measurable environmental impacts or concerns 
from uranium mining have been identified.  
In addition to biophysical effects monitoring, the AWG places significant attention on 
socio-economic issues monitoring as part of a larger benefits sharing arrangement established 
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through the IMA. Of particular interest are issues around training, education, and local business 
development. For example, many joint ventures and businesses (e.g. Northern Dené Airways 
Ltd., Points Athabasca Construction, Northern Resource Trucking Ltd.)  have formed as a direct 
result of the presence of the uranium industry (Parsons and Barsi, 2001), offering an enhanced 
business capacity in the Athabasca region along with increased employment opportunities for 
Athabasca residents (AWG, 2004). According to Parsons and Barsi (2001), development of the 
industry has required and sustained high levels of investment and employment, as well as a 
continuing supply of goods and services for the mine, mill, and community support 
infrastructure.  
 
2.5 Observations and Conclusion 
 
In principle, based on the international literature and reported cases across industries and regions, 
follow-up in EIA is said to be shifting from that of solely monitoring and evaluating biophysical 
impact predictions towards linking up with environmental management and, more recently, 
communicating about the environmental performance of a project with the local community 
(e.g., Marshall, 2005; Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005; Noble and Storey, 2005). That being 
said, there have been few, if any, empirical studies that systematically describe and explain this 
transformation and evolution of follow-up in the context of a single industry and region. In 
response, this paper set out to examine the institutional development and evolution of EIA 
follow-up, and its changing roles and stakes in Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry – an 
industry that has been unfolding on the northern Saskatchewan landscape since the mid-1930s 
and pre-dates formal EIA systems and practices. Based on the case study results, a number of 
observations are ventured concerning the development and shaping of follow-up in the industry. 
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While these observations are based on the northern Saskatchewan uranium mining context, 
arguably they are equally applicable to follow-up programs in other industries and regions. 
First, follow-up in northern Saskatchewan’s uranium industry has shifted from a program 
based exclusively on biophysical effects and compliance monitoring to one that includes also 
socioeconomic effects and issues monitoring. Consistent with previous reviews of follow-up case 
studies and practices in the Canadian context (e.g. Noble and Storey, 2005; Noble and Macharia, 
2004), follow-up and monitoring practices in the uranium industry were driven initially by 
regulatory requirements and focused heavily on compliance and biophysical effects monitoring 
in the local project environment. However, the public inquiry processes that characterized 
uranium development impact assessment during the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the 
privatization of uranium mining and a growing provincial interest in the socioeconomic 
development of the north, directed attention explicitly to the social and economic issues and 
concerns to northern communities. For the first time since the establishment of the industry, 
social and economic issues were brought to the forefront of development and impact assessment. 
Although social and economic issues did not at that time carry forward to the post-EIA stage of 
follow-up and monitoring, their inclusion in development impact assessment was instrumental in 
shaping the tripartite framework of government, industry, and community roles and stakes that 
emerged in the 1990s - later to be entrenched by the recommendations of the federal-provincial 
Joint Review Panel on uranium mining. 
Second, with increasing attention to social and economic issues in the EIA and regulatory 
process, communities have emerged with a more prominent role in follow-up and monitoring 
programs. Community involvement in follow-up was played out in various forms in the uranium 
industry, including monitoring partnerships, environmental quality committees, and community-
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industry working groups. Together, these partnerships, programs, and groups led to an increase 
in environmental regulation of the industry directly involving communities. Consistent with 
Morrison-Saunders and Arts (2005), there emerged a shift in follow-up and monitoring from 
regulator-driven compliance-based approaches towards a state of following-up for environmental 
management, with an increase in overall involvement and communication among all 
stakeholders, and a more community-centric approach with increased communication between 
community and industry and government.  
Third, as the follow-up and regulatory process continued to evolve, and environmental 
regulation directly involving communities continued to increase, industry emerged with a much 
stronger role and stake in follow-up relative to government. This was in sharp contrast to the 
system of follow-up that existed throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s. As Jenkins (2004: 
27) explains, “the mining industry, like any other, is subject to the pressures of increased 
stakeholder accountability and social and environmental responsibility: perhaps more so as they 
often operate in remote locations with indigenous peoples and their potential negative social and 
environmental impact is significant”. A reflection of the growth of corporate social responsibility 
and environmental management policies and programs in the mining sector in general, the 
uranium industry emerged with a felt responsibility to report to the public and its shareholders on 
its operations and performance. As Marshall (2005) explains, communication through 
monitoring was seen as a means to inform communities and enhance the relationship between the 
industry and affected communities to pre-empt concerns about development impacts. 
Finally, and closely associated with the above, is a more recent shift toward the 
privatization of follow-up and monitoring programs under the auspices of community-industry 
impact management agreements. This new era of follow-up is focused on private community-
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industry partnerships, agreements, and programs, and encompasses both community-based 
biophysical effects monitoring and community impact benefit monitoring. While the rise in 
privatized agreements may be in part a response to the deficiencies of the EIA process in terms 
of community engagement (see Galbraith et al., 2007), O’Faircheallaigh (2007) suggests that 
such agreements supplement, rather than replace, existing regulatory regimes and provide for 
more effective follow-up and environmental management of projects to take place while at the 
same time involving communities in a more meaningful way.  According to Falkner (2003) and 
Cashore (2002), follow-up of this nature may be a reflection of the growing philosophy of the 
privatization of environmental governance.   
 
2.5.1 Conclusion 
 
The institutional development of EIA follow-up in Saskatchewan’s uranium industry has been an 
ongoing process of transformation and evolution. This evolution, however, is best characterized 
as discontinuity: the displacement of one form of follow-up giving way to another; the 
discontinuity of unnatural breaks in regulatory systems and industry practices; and the disruption 
of a previously established follow-up order. The current system of follow-up in the uranium 
industry emerged from a solely regulatory-driven process of biophysical effects and compliance 
monitoring in the local project environment, to include also a more participatory but private 
partnership-based process with direct community engagement in off-site effects monitoring and 
the inclusion of socioeconomic and impact benefits monitoring.  This new privatized system of 
follow-up is likely a reflection of the reality doing business in the north, with increasing 
accountability and responsibility to communities. At the same time, however, much of this new 
era of follow-up practice is occurring outside the public realm of EIA. As a result, little is known 
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of the efficacy of follow-up under impact management agreements and of the real contribution of 
privatized follow-up to improved project performance and environmental effects management.  
As mineral and energy resource developments continue in northern Canada, and as the EIA 
process is increasingly criticized by industry, academics, and communities alike, there is a need 
to understand better the roles of follow-up under private agreements and how they can ‘link-up’ 
with the regulatory process in support of more informed development, better EIA, and overall 
improved environmental management practices.  
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 CHAPTER 3  
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRIVATIZED AGREEMENTS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP IN 
SASKATCHEWAN’S URANIUM MINING INDUSTRY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a planning process used to predict, assess, mitigate, 
and monitor the potential environmental and social impacts that may be associated with a 
proposed development project. Fundamental to the EIA process is follow-up, “...the monitoring 
and evaluation of the actual impacts of a project that has been subject to EIA for management of, 
and communication about, the environmental performance of that project (Marshall et al., 2005; 
Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2004). As a feedback and learning process, follow-up in EIA serves 
to improve project environmental performance and management practices, ensuring that projects 
are meeting intended goals and objectives, that mitigation measures are working, and that 
unforeseen impacts are detected.  Despite this, follow-up in the post-consent decision stages of 
EIA is performed in only a minority of cases and has been described as the missing link between 
EIA and effective project management (Noble and Storey, 2005; Ramos et al., 2004). In those 
cases where follow-up has been done, it has taken place at the level of the regulator and the 
proponent with much less attention to actively engaging communities and stakeholders in follow-
up and monitoring activities (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005). Part of the reason for this, 
explains Galbraith et al. (2007), is that the current EIA process does not adequately provide 
project-specific follow-up, consider project and community benefits, or build trust and capacity 
among stakeholders. That said, there is now emerging, particularly in Canada’s northern regions, 
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a new institutional form of EIA follow-up: community-based monitoring programs, under the 
auspices of formal community-industry Environmental Agreements. 
Environmental Agreements are one of three types of agreements often negotiated between 
a community and industrial proponent as part of the EIA process. Whereas Socioeconomic 
Agreements (SA) and Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) focus on broader economic 
development and the specific benefits that a community can expect from development in 
exchange for support and cooperation, Environmental Agreements are focused on project impact 
mitigation, monitoring, and follow-up (Galbraith et al., 2007). Environmental Agreements cover 
the entirety of a project, including: construction, operation, rehabilitation, and decommissioning, 
and seek to facilitate the participation of Aboriginal peoples, governments, and resource 
developers in the environmental management of projects in ways that do not occur under existing 
regulatory regimes (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). In this way, Environmental Agreements have the 
potential to supplement existing EIA processes and to involve key actors in creating institutional 
structures and management processes deliberately and specifically designed to facilitate 
community involvement, and to promote effective EIA follow-up and adaptive management over 
the course of a project (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007).  
The challenge, however, is that notwithstanding the growth of Environmental Agreements 
they are also privatized agreements and very little is known about their nature and role in the 
post-decision stages of EIA.   Aside from few select studies (e.g. Prno and Bradshaw, 2008; 
Galbraith et al. 2007, Fidler and Hitch, 2007; O’Faircheallaigh 2007; O’Faircheallaigh and 
Corbett 2005), there has been little research on emerging Environmental Agreements in EIA, and 
even less concerning the nature of these agreements and their role in project and community 
impact management and follow-up.  As such, the purpose of this paper is to examine the role of 
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community-based Environmental Agreements in and their contributions to EIA follow-up and 
impact management practices.  In order to accomplish this, a case study of the Athabasca 
Working Group (AWG) Environmental Agreement in Northern Saskatchewan’s uranium 
industry is explored.  Specifically, this paper examines the scope of the AWG Environmental 
Agreement, including the nature of community involvement in monitoring programs, with the 
aim of understanding whether and how such agreements contribute to EIA follow-up and impact 
management practices.  
This paper consists of four main sections, including the introduction.  In the section that 
follows a brief overview of Environmental Agreements and EIA follow-up is presented. This is 
followed by an overview of the AWG Environmental Agreement in Saskatchewan’s uranium 
industry, and the results of the case study analysis.  The paper concludes with observations 
regarding the role of Environmental Agreements in and their relationship to regulatory EIA 
follow-up.  
 
 
3.2 The Nature and Scope of Environmental Agreements  
 
Environmental Agreements are formal agreements between a community and a development 
proponent as a means of managing the impacts of project development and operations (Galbraith 
et al., 2007; Galbraith, 2005; Armitage, 2005; Dreyer and Meyers, 2004). Sosa and Keenan 
(2001) note that these agreements are negotiated for different reasons, depending on the 
particular Aboriginal land and resource rights, the regulatory framework in place, and the 
relationship that exists between the affected communities and the mining company.  While 
earlier forms of community-industry agreements focused primarily on employment, more recent 
agreements often include social and cultural programs, dispute resolution mechanisms and 
 52
revenue sharing provisions, and environmental restrictions among other elements (Sosa and 
Keenan, 2001).  
Negotiated Environmental Agreements are now almost commonplace in the mining sectors 
of Canada, Australia, and the USA, and are beginning to emerge in developing nations and in 
other industry sectors (O’Faircheallaigh and Corbett, 2005). In the Canadian northern context, 
five Environmental Agreements for major projects have been implemented in the past decade, 
namely for the Ekati, Diavik, and Snap Lake diamond mines in the Northwest Territories, the 
Voisey’s Bay nickel mine in Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Horizon Oil Sands project, 
Alberta. All five agreements establish goals and mandates that relate to Aboriginal participation 
in environmental management, EIA follow-up, and adaptive management; only two (Diavik and 
Snap Lake) included government as a signatory; none emerged because of a legal requirement 
for the negotiation of an agreement (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). 
Environmental Agreements are, arguably, a reflection of the growing philosophy of the 
privatization of environmental governance (Falkner, 2003; Cashore, 2002).  An assessment of 
the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board (MVEIRB) and associated IBAs, for 
example, was conducted by Galbraith et al. (2007) to determine whether the rise of these private 
agreements might be attributable partly to deficiencies in the environmental assessment process.  
The authors concluded that their evaluation not only supported this hypothesis stating “…these 
deficiencies could certainly account for the rise of private agreements” but also added that 
“further evidence was provided by the key informants when asked directly about their rationales 
for using these agreements” (Galbraith et al., 2007: 36). In addition, they found that the 
agreements associated with the MVEIRB addressed particular issues and potential effects that 
the EIA did not.  
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Galbraith et al. (2007: 38) concluded that their findings not only suggested a link between 
the rise of private agreements and the design and practice of EIA, but it “...was apparent that 
these agreements deliberately offset failings in the design and practice of the MVEIRB E[I]A 
process”.  Galbraith et al. (2007) argued that the conventional EIA process does not adequately 
provide for project-specific follow-up, consider benefits, or build trust and capacity among 
stakeholders. Arguably, as a result, more Environmental Agreements have arisen, in part, to 
compensate for these perceived deficiencies in EIA design and practice. O’Faircheallaigh (2007) 
echoes this claim, arguing that Environmental Agreements provide institutional structure and 
opportunity to promote and facilitate good follow-up practice. As the use and implementation of 
Environmental Agreements continue to rise, and as EIA follow-up practice in general continues 
to struggle, there is an increasing interest in the potential of such agreements to ‘link-up’ with 
and facilitate EIA follow-up.  
 
 
3.2.1 Linking environmental agreements with EIA follow-up 
 
The majority of follow-up activity in EIA is institutionalized at the level of the regulator and the 
proponent, with much less attention to actively engaging communities and stakeholders in 
follow-up and monitoring activities (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005). While the potential for 
EIA follow-up at the community-level is well-documented (e.g., Hunsberger et al., 2005; 
Morrison-Saunders et al., 2003), recent experience in northern Canada suggests that meaningful 
involvement in follow-up has not frequently occurred from either a community or Aboriginal 
perspective (Lawe et al., 2005). Thus, it is evident that conventional EIA does not adequately 
address the importance and role of local communities and especially northern Aboriginal 
populations in follow-up practice (Galbraith, 2005; O’Faircheallaigh, 1999; Tollefson and 
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Wipond, 1998; Edelstein and Kleese, 1995; Higgins, 1993). Environmental Agreements may 
have the potential to respond to this inadequacy through their focus on impact management at the 
level of the community, Aboriginal groups, and the proponent, and with an emphasis on 
community involvement – principles inherent to good follow-up. 
According to O’Faircheallaigh (2007: 322), “the goals and mandates of many existing 
corporate and government institutions involved in environmental management do not afford a 
central place to promoting indigenous participation, effective EIA follow-up, or adaptive 
management.” However, in recent years the negotiations of private agreements have created a 
unique facet of communication and sense of understanding between indigenous communities and 
proponents of resource development to do just that.  As O’Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2005) 
propose, IBAs and Environmental Agreements have facilitated an alternative mechanism through 
which communities may be able to fulfil their desire and their responsibility to be involved in 
minimizing adverse environmental impacts from large-scale resource development.  
The benefits of involving communities in the EIA process have long been recognized, and 
range from ensuring that the project itself carries more legitimacy to enhancing the effectiveness 
of monitoring and impact management measures. Hunsberger et al. (2005: 624), for example, 
“suggest that increased citizen participation in follow-up activities such as monitoring could help 
to improve the quality and local relevance of environmental assessment, while at the same time 
advancing the process toward sustainability goals”.  This is consistent with O’Faircheallaigh and 
Corbett’s study (2005: 630) of indigenous participation in environmental mining projects, where 
the authors found that “…effective environmental management cannot be achieved without 
substantial input from civil society and indigenous peoples”. Hunsberger et al. (2005) go on to 
suggest that follow-up programs utilizing community-based monitoring should not only better 
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assist in tracking cumulative effects of multiple projects, but also advance the follow-up process 
toward sustainability goals. 
Strictly from a monitoring perspective, Environmental Agreements also present the 
opportunity to facilitate the integration of local and traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) in 
follow-up practices.  Broadly speaking, TEK refers to “…a cumulative body of knowledge, 
practice and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through generations by 
cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one 
another and their environment” (Berkes, 1999: 8).  Usher (2000: 186-187) further classifies TEK 
into the following four categories of information: (1) Knowledge about the environment; (2) 
Knowledge about past and current use of the environment; (3) Culturally based values about the 
environment; and (4) Culturally based cosmology serving as a foundation of the knowledge 
system that underlies the first three categories and is the framework with which people construct 
knowledge from facts.  In Canada, especially in northern Canada, it has become a policy 
requirement that TEK be considered and incorporated into environmental assessment and 
resource management (Usher, 2000), and a considerable body of literature stresses the need for 
and importance of TEK in both EIA follow-up practices and Environmental Agreements 
themselves (e.g., O’Faircheallaigh, 2007; O’Faircheallaigh and Corbett, 2005, Armitage, 2005; 
Feit, 2005; Galbraith, 2005; Usher, 2000). According to O’Faircheallaigh (2007: 324), 
Environmental Agreements “...should provide for the mobilization and application of relevant 
knowledge” and it is in this regard that TEK can play a central role. In the case of Hydro 
Quebec’s la Grande Hydroelectric Complex, for example, Denis (2000) reports that the 
knowledge base of Aboriginal communities is being incorporated into project impact 
management and ecological restoration programs. Similarly, evidence from the US Glen Canyon 
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Dam project (Austin, 2000) indicates that community involvement in follow-up programs may 
lead to an increased capacity to deal with environmental change and the impacts caused by 
project development.  
In summary, central to Environmental Agreements is a commitment to ongoing systems of 
environmental monitoring and review and use of the information generated to assess EIA 
predictions and the efficacy of impact management. It is this ongoing system of monitoring and 
performance evaluation that is said to be “…precisely what has been missing from conventional 
regulatory systems that emphasize project approval...” (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007: 336). In recent 
years there has been an increase in Environmental Agreements, particularly in northern Canada 
and in the mining sector at large.  However, the corresponding literature is limited and also fairly 
recent and, as such, little is known about the nature and efficacy of monitoring provisions under 
Environmental Agreements or whether Environmental Agreements support regulatory-based EIA 
follow-up programs at all. That being said, as northern resource development continues to 
increase, and as the Canadian federal EIA system itself is currently under review, now is an 
opportune time to learn from case experience and to identify opportunities to link up 
Environmental Agreements and associated monitoring programs with EIA-based follow-up 
practices and impact management.  
 
 
3.3 Case Study: The Athabasca Working Group Environmental Agreement 
 
The northern Athabasca region of Saskatchewan, Canada, holds many high-grade uranium 
deposits and is home to several small, remote Aboriginal communities (Figure 3.1). The 
Athabasca Basin has been a focus for the uranium mining industry since the 1930s when 
pitchblende, an oxide of uranium, was discovered on the northern shore of Lake Athabasca 
 57
(Wiles et al., 1999).  Occupying nearly one third of the surface area of the Saskatchewan Shield 
(100,000 square kilometres) the northern Athabasca region is one of the world’s most important 
supplies of uranium, accounting for approximately 30% of world output (GOS, 2007; Card et al., 
2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 3.1 – Main Uranium Mining Operations in the Athabasca Basin 
Source: Map produced by Keith Bigelow, University of Saskatchewan  
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The province’s uranium mines are primarily owned and operated by Cameco Corporation 
and A
 
an has experienced active uranium exploration, 
devel
a) 
cludes 
ly: 
he AWG in 1999, a comprehensive Environmental 
Agree ment, 
reva Resources Canada, with McLean Lake, Key Lake/McArthur River, and Rabbit Lake 
being the three main uranium mines currently operating in northern Saskatchewan.  In 2007, a 
total of 9,465 tonnes of uranium (24.6 million pounds of U3O8) was produced by Saskatchewan
mines via underground, open pit, and stockpile mining. Over the last three decades in particular, 
uranium has been an important Canadian energy resource used in nuclear power reactors, 
providing 15% of Canada’s electricity supply (SMA, 2007). As the demand for uranium 
continues to increase internationally; value, production and extraction from northern 
Saskatchewan uranium mines continue to rise. 
Since the late 1940s, northern Saskatchew
opment, and processing under a range of impact management and regulatory frameworks 
that have shaped the current roles and stakes of follow-up in the uranium mining industry. In 
1993, the Athabasca Working Group (AWG) was created by Cameco and Cogema (now Arev
in response to recommendations of a Joint federal-provincial EIA Panel appointed to examine 
the environmental, health, and socio-economic effects of uranium mining in northern 
Saskatchewan (Cameco, 2007; AWG, 2004; Noble and Bronson, 2004).  The AWG in
both Cameco and Areva, and represents the seven communities of the Athabasca Basin, name
Black Lake Denésuline Nation, Fond du Lac Denésuline, and Hatchet Lake Denésuline, along 
with the northern settlements of Camsell Portage, Uranium City and Wollastin Lake and the 
northern Hamlet of Stony Rapids.  
Following negotiations with t
ment was signed focusing on three major areas: environmental protection; employ
training and business development; and benefit sharing (Cameco 2007; AWG, 2004). The 
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rationale for the AWG and the Environmental Agreement is largely attributed to the recogn
need to increase trust and reassurance and to build relationships with local communities, 
emerging in part from a sense of corporate responsibility to ensure that stakeholders are in
and familiar with the mining activities taking place in the region.  As part of the Environmental 
Agreement, a community-based environmental monitoring program was established in 2000 to 
monitor the ‘off-site’ impacts of uranium mining operations within the vicinity of the northern 
communities. Currently in its 9
ized 
volved 
  
 
.3.1 Methods 
 interviews and document reviews were utilized to carry out this research.  Aided 
 and 
unn, 
cularly 
uld 
th year, little is known about the efficacy of this monitoring 
program and, more specifically, its role, if any, in EIA follow-up and impact management. 
 
3
 
Semi-structured
by an interview schedule of ordered but flexible questions and discussion points, a total of 22 
semi-structured interviews were conducted from February to August 2008.  The interviews 
explored three main themes: the AWG Environmental Agreement including roles, rationale,
monitoring program scope and coordination; the benefits and challenges of the Agreement; and 
the future directions of the Agreement.  This flexibility in interview design facilitated a more 
natural conversation and accommodated change in the presentation of questions to ensure 
specific themes could be fully explored and developed (see Flowerdew and Martin, 2005; D
2000). Concomitantly, it allowed for structure in the organization and categorization of 
information based on a predetermined framework of evaluation.  Interviews were a parti
useful technique in this research for many reasons: they assisted in filling a gap in knowledge 
which other methods, such as document review, were unable to bridge effectively; complex 
behaviours and motivations could be investigated; a diversity of opinions and experiences co
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be collected as interviews provide insights into differing opinions, but may reveal consensus on 
some issues (Dunn, 2000: 52). Interviews were tailored based on the participants so as to 
accommodate and account for the different parties’ involvement in the industry and AWG
acknowledging that some may be more familiar with particular aspects of the Agreement tha
others.    
Wit
, 
n 
h consent, all interviews were audio taped and then transcribed. Interviews were 
analy nto 
n 
 
terviews with industry and regulators  
ompleted with various uranium mining representatives 
fied 
ue (see 
ficials were requested by email and telephone invitation where a 
brief 
zed with the assistance of Atlas.ti © software whereby each interview was classified i
themes and then assigned different codes to interpret the data.  By coding the data, interpretatio
of information and linking relationships or concepts together was done effectively. In addition, 
Atlas.ti made the retrieval and the overall organization of data a much more efficient process.  
 
In
 
Twelve semi-structured interviews were c
from Cameco and Areva, federal and provincial government regulators, and environmental 
consultants.  Initial identification of industry participants was done with the assistance of 
Cameco Corporation’s Environmental Affairs group.  Remaining interviewees were identi
using a purposeful sampling procedure by seeking out industry representatives, regulators, and 
industry consultants in positions who were likely to have in-depth knowledge of EIA, the 
uranium industry, and the AWG Environmental Agreement, using a ‘snowballing’ techniq
Mason, 2002; Bryman, 2001).   
Interviews with industry of
research summary including purpose and objectives were provided, and by word of mouth.  
These interviews ranged from half an hour to two hours in duration, with the intent to gather 
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qualitative data and to gather knowledge from industry, government, and environmental 
consultants on the three main themes outlined in the interview schedule.  In addition, the 
interviews provided for a more in-depth inquiry as to how the AWG and the Environment
Agreement developed and how data collected from the community-based program are being 
in management and follow-up practices.  Ten face-to-face interviews were carried out, and two 
telephone-interviews were conducted in those cases where a one-on-one meeting was not 
possible due to scheduling. Interviews conducted in person took place at a participant’s pla
business. All interviews were scheduled according to the interviewee’s availability; and 
telephone-interviews were scheduled in a manner where the researcher would call at the 
time agreed upon by both parties. A card was mailed out to each individual thanking him/ her for 
their participation in the project. It was apparent that an adequate number of officials and 
regulators had been contacted when the themes and/or comments within interviews began 
repeat themselves, and when the names of potential participants also started to become repetit
 
al 
used 
ce of 
selected 
to 
ive.  
Local AWG community interviews 
e conducted at Wollostan Lake and the Pine Channel 
e Pine 
 
 by 
e 
 
Ten semi-structured interviews wer
Community Pilgrimage with local community representatives and elders of the AWG.  Th
Channel Pilgrimage is held annually for up to two weeks in the summer months where all Dené 
communities in the Athabasca Basin gather to take part in various community and religious 
activities (e.g. communions and confirmations).  Interviews with the Athabascan community
members involved a one-week trip by the researcher in July to the northern basin, coordinated
Cameco’s Northern Community Relations Committee.  A brief research summary including the 
purpose, objectives, and the interview questions were provided to the Northern Community 
Relations Coordinators in advance.  Efforts to organize this trip involved email and telephon
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discussions with Cameco’s Northern Affairs Group on the logistics of the trip including: flight 
arrangements to various northern locations; accommodations; obtaining a Dené-speaking 
translator; and daily transportation via boat to and from the Pilgrimage.  
A total of four interviews were conducted with Wollostan Lake community members and 
elders  
hannel 
 
 
ith the AWG community members held at both Wollostan Lake and Pine 
Chan d to 
s 
 at the Hatchet Lake Denésuline First Nations Economic Development Corporation Office.
Interviews at Wollostan Lake were administered with the assistance of an AWG member and 
Cameco’s Northern Affair’s Group. Six interviews were conducted at the Pine Channel 
Community Pilgrimage, northwest of Stoney Rapids.  The interview process at the Pine C
Pilgrimage involved first visiting and making acquaintances with individuals at their campsite, 
having tea, and general conversation.  After this initial contact had been established, the research
project was introduced, and their participation in an interview requested.   Individuals associated 
with mining companies (e.g. those employed by or who had family employed by organizations 
such as Cameco or Areva) often declined; however, some did participate.  As participation was 
voluntary, interviews were done on the basis of who was available, showed interest, and was 
willing to participate.  In some cases participants agreed to an interview and expressed returning 
the next day, but were often unavailable at that time.  AWG members who expressed interest in 
participating in an interview but were not available during the Pilgrimage were contacted via 
telephone three to five times at a later date; unfortunately no response was ever received from
these individuals. 
Interviews w
nel were up to one hour in duration.  Interview questions were open-ended and attempte
ascertain local community members’ perspectives and views on the AWG monitoring program 
and the Environmental Agreement.  In addition, it offered a more in-depth inquiry of the benefit
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of the community monitoring program, its challenges, and areas in need of improvement. When 
necessary, a Dené-speaking translator was used.  An honoraria gift of tobacco, tea, and a 
University of Saskatchewan pin was offered to each individual thanking them for their 
participation in the project.   
 
 
ocument reviews 
plemented by document reviews in order to provide additional information 
volved 
 2002).  
where  a 
 
 
 to 
D
 
Interviews were sup
on the establishment, background, and nature of the AWG monitoring program and the 
Environmental Agreement. Document review broadly refers to the various procedures in
in analyzing and interpreting data generated from the examination of documents and records 
relevant to a particular study (Schwandt, 2007). When applied, document reviews are an 
unintrusive form of research with minimal, if any, impact on the research setting (Babbie,
The document review method possesses a variety of strengths, including an approach 
 a researcher can accesses the appropriate documents and categorize them according to
predetermined conceptual framework; the process is relatively inexpensive; it is a good tool for 
studying a wide variety of communications; and it allows a researcher to study processes over a 
time period, and given the static nature of the research setting, results may be verified (or not) by
other investigators (Babbie, 2002; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Babbie 1992).   Documents 
used for this study were collected and reviewed between October 2007 and June 2008.  These
documents included: uranium mining reports in northern Saskatchewan; Cameco records, 
articles, and files (e.g. Northern Saskatchewan’s Environmental Quality Committee Report
Communities, 2002-2003; Northern Saskatchewan Community Vitality Monitoring Annual 
Report, 2003); the Environmental Agreement established between Cameco, Areva, and the 
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AWG; AWG Annual Reports; and other research completed on both industry environmental
assessments and the Environmental Agreement documents and literature available to date.  
 
 
 
.4 Results 
s that follow the results of the case study interviews and document analyses are 
 
 
 
er) is 
re 
3.4.1 Community-based environmental monitoring program nature and scope 
ental 
 and 
the 
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In the section
presented. Attention is focused on the environmental protection component of the Agreement,
specifically the community-based monitoring program, and how it ‘links up’ with project-based
EIA follow-up processes. The results are presented in three major sections: the nature and scope 
of the Environmental Agreement’s community-based environmental monitoring program; 
perceived benefits emerging from the Environmental Agreement and monitoring program; and 
enduring challenges.  Each section identifies and discusses the major themes that emerged from
interviews and document reviews. So as to ensure the confidentiality of interview participants, 
only aggregate or summary results of the interviews are presented. In other cases, the 
participants’ general affiliation (e.g. industry, regulator, consultant, community memb
identified but the names of specific companies, community affiliation, or government units a
withheld. 
 
 
The community-based environmental monitoring program under the AWG Environm
Agreement is intended to ensure that no adverse environmental effects from uranium mining
milling operations are affecting the air, water, vegetation, and wildlife surrounding the seven 
Athabascan communities in the Basin.  Funded by Cameco and Areva, the AWG has directed 
environmental monitoring program since 2000 (Cameco, 2009). The program involves industry 
hiring a consultant who partners with a northern community representative to monitor industry 
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effects.  According to industry officials, the program originated at the request of the AWG 
communities. It was said that communities requested assurance that no environmental effec
were occurring downstream surrounding each of the seven northern Athabascan communities 
from any uranium mining activities, and that it was repeatedly stated by the Athabascan 
communities that they wanted a means to monitor the environment themselves so as to en
that information and results from monitoring would be unbiased.  According to AWG Annual 
Reports
ts 
sure 
training 
e 
 
ature and scope of the monitoring program 
n the spring (June) and fall (September), and 
itional 
 
 
 
                                                
3 (AWG, 2004; 2006), and industry and consultant interview participants, the 
environmental monitoring program emphasizes community involvement and includes 
community representatives to collect samples to monitor baseline environmental indicators. Th
community is responsible for both appointing representatives and selecting local people to 
participate in environmental monitoring.  To date, no adverse effects have been detected. 
 
N
 
Environmental monitoring data are collected i
include samples related to air quality (radon gas); water quality in streams and lakes near 
communities; lake sediment; vegetation quality and occurrence, including berries and trad
use plants; and animal muscle tissue for health and contaminants assessment (Cameco, 2007a; 
AWG, 2006; 2004).  Members of the AWG collectively identify specific monitoring locations 
near the communities (AWG, 2006; 2004), and Aboriginal local community members facilitate
and participate in the collection of environmental data, which are then tested by independent 
environmental consultants (Cameco, 2007a; AWG, 2006; 2004).  Discrepancy and uncertainty
does seem to exist concerning who decides on sample locations and sample types.  Although 
literature and interviewees from industry and some environmental consultants indicate that all
 
3 Annual Reports for following years have either not been released or made publically available. 
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data collected through the program (i.e. location and types of samples)  is largely determined an
influenced by the communities themselves, and incorporated forms of local knowledge
d 
t was not 
curren s all 
d by 
l 
r-
 
cientific merit and use of local knowledge 
ollows standard scientific protocol for sample 
 a 
g 
                                                
4, several 
AWG community members said that it was industry who determined what was collected, and 
where.  One consultant noted that determining monitoring indicators was done cooperatively 
with the AWG Board, community elders, industry, and independent biologists.   
When asked if additional types of data should be collected or monitored tha
tly included in the scope of the monitoring program, community and elder participant
indicated a need for additional testing of water quality in lakes and streams, including also 
testing of additional small fish species, such as minnows, which have reportedly been notice
community members as occasionally found floating ashore with deformed bodies.  A number of 
community interviewees attributed this occurrence to mining operations; noting that local 
fishermen never had prior experiences of this kind, and that occurrences are reported to be 
largely on the west side of lake Athabasca where mining activity is concentrated.  Additiona
indicators or variables identified as important to include in the monitoring program were low-
bush berries, such as blackberries; birds and their nesting eggs, for potential deformities; large
scale disasters, such as forest fires, and the effects on wildlife and habitat; and the long-term 
effects of uranium mining on the community. 
 
S
 
The community-based monitoring program f
collection and processing, allowing results to be comprehendible, understood, and trusted in
scientific realm. However, some participants suggested that local community knowledge is bein
utilized and plays a significant role in the program.  For example, one consultant, who served as 
 
4 When industry utilizes TEK it is usually narrow in scope. 
 67
an aquatic ecologist and worked with the communities to collect monitoring data, suggested that 
the program provided a good example of mixing traditional knowledge and western science, 
because both knowledge systems were utilized and equally valued.  
That being said, one industry interviewee explained that data collected by the communities 
is not
, the 
nt 
 
 size 
 by the 
G had 
 
omfort monitoring 
wees commented on the importance of the communities collecting 
; 
 truly of “...acceptable quality because frequency of samples are so low when compared to 
the upwards of 750 samples collected for industry’s impact management program.” Another 
industry participant went on to explain that although methods for data analysis from the 
community-based monitoring program and industry’s EIA follow-up program are similar
results are not “directly comparable” as how and where samples are taken differ.  One consulta
echoed this claim, stating that the community-based monitoring data are supplementary to 
industry or regulatory follow-up programs, “...because it’s definitely not based on the same
sampling locations” and  “[t]hey’re collecting it from a larger area but with a smaller sample
so it makes it difficult to actually compare the two”.  Interestingly, when community 
interviewees were asked whether they felt that industry regarded information collected
AWG program to be important in effects management, participants responded positively, 
suggesting that the data was considered important and that industry listened when the AW
concerns about monitoring results or felt that additional monitoring was necessary. 
 
C
 
Several industry intervie
monitoring data, as the results have greater merit and are more accepted in the community realm
however, industry, government, and consultants all shared the same view that no environmental 
effects from uranium mining facilities could actually be detected at the community monitoring 
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locations – the sites are simply too far removed from mining operations. As such, there is genera
consensus among industry, government, and consultant participants that the community-based 
environmental monitoring program is ‘comfort monitoring.’ As one interviewee explains, 
comfort monitoring was introduced to the Agreement as a scientific approach to alleviate n
scientific (community) concerns, while providing communities with a sense of ownership and a
opportunity for technology transfer.  Consequently, the monitoring program is complementary to 
EIA follow-up and monitoring activities carried out by the industry, but it does not replace such 
activities.  Another industry representative mentioned that the monitoring conducted by the 
program is specifically designed to leave the communities comfortable and at ease that no 
impacts are occurring.  Although the program was designed to monitor and document poten
changes in the environment as a result of uranium production (AWG, 2006), it primarily serves 
to provide Athabascan communities  with “peace of mind knowing results have not been 
tampered with”, thereby maintaining a level of trust and assurance. In an effort to keep da
results impartial, monitoring samples collected by community members are treated 
independently and processed by the Saskatchewan Research Council.   
 
l 
on-
n 
tial 
ta and 
 
.4.2 Perceived benefits emerging from the monitoring program and Agreement 
ts 
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The AWG monitoring program under the Environmental Agreement has provided many benefi
to both industry and community.  These benefits, based on the interview results, include 
increased communication among community and industry; a developing sense of trust an
assurance; education and capacity building; and improved corporate image.  
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Increased communication among community and industry 
f the benefits of the monitoring 
le, that 
e, further 
 
st 
s 
Sense of trust and assurance 
ation, additional benefits have emerged.  In particular, a degree of 
allows us 
 
There was general consensus among participants that one o
program, and a primary benefit of the Environmental Agreement in general, has been the 
increase in communication between both parties. Local community and elder participants 
suggested that the AWG and monitoring partnership was a positive one, noting, for examp
meeting with the industry provided an opportunity for communities to discuss their 
environmental concerns.   An AWG member, who is also a community representativ
added that the AWG allows the community voice to be heard.  Representatives from industry 
echoed this claim, stating that the Agreement provides “... a very respectful setting and that the
balance of power seems to be even-handed. It provides a forum of communication, exchange, 
and resolutions.”  Another indicated that “the primary benefit [of the Agreement] was that it ju
gave us a really unique opportunity to establish a really close working relationship with northern 
communities.” This participant went on to note that the relationship between the groups is “...not 
perfect, but it’s another conduit that through which we could establish a special relationship”.  
Consistent with industry, interviewees from the consulting sector agreed that the Agreement ha
facilitated communication as it has “...provided a venue for mutual communication between 
company and communities”. 
 
 
Through increased communic
trust and assurance seems to have developed between community and industry. One industry 
participant expressed that the Agreement “is a reassurance provided to northerners, to 
government, to ourselves that we are in fact not having effects as we had predicted.  It 
to use that information to build confidence in the industry and really will be the basis of moving 
 70
forward with future initiatives with that confidence in place”.  Another industry participant said 
that the Agreement increased the confidence that Athabascans had in industry, and it was a tool 
to earn a broader corporate social license.  That being said, some community interviewees 
communicated some suspicions of monitoring program results, and questioned the integrity
industry.  However, one community elder explains “you can’t actually just blame industry” for 
all environmental impacts occurring in the Basin. She gave an example of a fish deformity that, 
upon dissection, was found to be caused by common household waste as opposed to industry-
caused contamination.  
Overall, communi
 of 
ty participants spoke positively about the monitoring program and noted 
that it
g our 
fits 
Education and capacity building 
tants all agree that an important feature of the Agreement, 
through the AWG monitoring program, is that it facilitates community education and increased 
 was protecting both land and livelihood. As one community member noted, “there’s been 
a few minor damages but I don’t think its created long-term effects, but they’ve been cleaning it 
up.  They’ve been more or less trying to contain it.  Better ways to improve it for next time, so 
that’s a big change for the last 20 years.”  Industry, government, and consultant representatives 
shared this view, affirming that the comfort provided to local stakeholders assisted in building 
trust, and allowed for more effective communication to occur.  As one industry participant 
explains, instead of having several meetings where communities would say “you’re pollutin
water, you’re polluting our fish, we [industry] can get over that and onto other issues and have 
more meaningful discussions about other things that might matter”.  It is apparent that trust, 
assurance, communication, and comfort are complimentary and form the core of the key bene
emerging from the Agreement and monitoring program.   
 
 
Government, industry, and consul
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awareness of what is occurring in the local area by way of uranium mining and environmenta
change. One industry interviewee explained that the monitoring program educates the 
community by informing them of mine site activities and processes, while allowing them to gai
knowledge from the scientific process of gathering data. One of the industry consultant
that the entire program under the Agreement “introduced an educational component that has 
been hugely important in filling an information gap that was absolutely massive between 
communities, companies, and governments”. Industry participants further suggested that an 
important feature of this education is that it also builds capacity in the communities.  It wa
that building capacity is not only inherent in the Agreement, but the intent behind it was well
The interviewee went on to explain that “...building capacity in these communities so they can 
not only understand and articulate the impacts on the environment could be realized through 
uranium mining [was significant], but they can also get to build their own capacity to sort of 
monitor their own environment, to explain what’s going on, and to understand how changes c
occur in key species and valued ecosystems”.  
 
 
l 
n 
s added 
s noted 
.  
an 
Corporate image 
Finally, the last benefit identified was one experienced by industry itself – that of building a 
age. One consultant felt that the image of mining companies, particularly in 
uch as 
 
, 
better corporate im
the north, where it is of greatest importance to them, has become more positive as a result of 
Environmental Agreements.  It was mentioned that the companies are regarded as doing 
something useful and being fairly proactive at doing it, therefore the industry image has 
developed on its own. A participant from industry added that other First Nation groups, s
those in Australia, appear to be more willing to conduct business with companies such as
Cameco, after having heard of the positive outcomes associated with the Agreement.  As a result
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the interviewee explains, this potentially provides greater opportunities to expand mining 
ventures internationally.  
 
3.4.3 Enduring challenges
 
 
 
otwithstanding the perceived benefits, there are also many challenges associated with the 
ironmental Agreement. These include issues related to 
 
Communication of monitoring program results 
Participants identified a need for improvements in communication and dissemination of the 
nities.  This need was largely recognized by 
 often 
ut 
cals to understand what the 
results are: “you are often dealing with people who don’t speak English or have limited English 
N
monitoring program and Env
communication of monitoring program results; continuity, coordination, and consultation; 
transparency of the Environmental Agreement; and the need for on-going review and
transformation of the Agreement itself.  
 
 
monitoring program results to the AWG commu
industry and First Nations participants, although one consultant also shared this perspective. 
Participants noted that monitoring results, which are presented usually in pamphlet or report 
format, do not relay results in a meaningful way to the Aboriginal community. For example, 
three community elders and two other community members indicated that the results are 
essentially “alien” to them and hold no real value as reported in their current form.  Industry 
tended to agree, with one participant indicating that the system of information sharing has
been “...to create a beautiful nice document which is understood in Saskatoon quite readily” b
it means little to the northern Aboriginal community member.  
The consultant who participated in data collection with the communities noted that one of 
the most difficult aspects of the entire process is trying to get lo
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and d
 
 
is can 
of 
nity participants recognized that meetings have 
been esting 
whoever 
 lot of 
o not understand what graphs or numbers are attempting to indicate”. Perhaps even more 
problematic, however, is that many community participants noted that they had never before
seen, heard of, or received any results from the monitoring program.  Community and industry 
participants both recognized this concern.  For example, industry officials expressed that 
communicating results is where the “break-down of the program” begins and that the main 
difficulty is “indeed getting the right amount of information to those who are interested in it and
we [industry] struggle ensure that we’re trying new things all the time to make sure that th
take place”. Another industry participant added that the difficulty lies in the industry’s lack 
confidence that what is being communicated to community representatives is actually being 
circulated back into the community at large. 
Community interviewees suggested that if results were presented in picture or video 
format, or translated to traditional Dené language, then it would possibly increase local 
understanding. That being said, some commu
held and often attendance and interest is quite low.  Industry participants agreed, sugg
that engaging communities often proves to be difficult.  For example, it was stated that “
shows up to a northern meeting is entirely whimsical…but there’s a limit to how much 
manipulation you [industry] can apply then and still be credible”.  One elder acknowledged this 
claim, stating that “...sometimes it’s most of our fault that we don’t get information because there 
has been meetings posted for us to participate regarding the AWG for that meeting but a
people doesn’t participle in”. It is apparent that both parties involved with the Agreement 
concede that a solution is required for the dissemination of results, and in particular there is a 
need to improve how those results are shared and communicated so they are understood by and 
accessible to local stakeholders and elders.  
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Continuity, coordination, and consultation 
A second challenge pertains to the continuity of individuals involved in the monitoring program, 
and on the AWG Board. There is general con
 
sensus among industry, community, and consultants 
ls involved is quite low, often causing some 
 cases 
rs 
 
tion 
 a limited 
under
 
raised concern about not having the right people involved.  The two participants suggested that 
that the permanence or stability of individua
confusion for both industry and community members and a break-down in communication and 
understanding of issues. This becomes a challenge when people are conveying their concerns to 
those who they believe to be the appropriate individual, group, or committee, but in many
concerns may never actually be heard as these members may no longer be involved with the 
AWG membership. A consultant described this as “moving targets from the community-side” 
stating that there appeared to be “a roll-over of members” where a new community member 
always seemed to be on a committee, and there is a lack of consistency of community membe
who attend AWG meetings.  One elder expressed similar frustration, suggesting that overall too
many different groups and committees existed and this was leading to failures in communica
as “...everything falls apart because everyone thinks well, they’re looking after that”.   
The issue here largely stems from having too many different people and sub-committees 
involved in the monitoring program and Agreement, and not enough continuity or awareness of 
membership. It was interesting to note that one industry representative felt that at times
standing also exists within the industry itself, which may result from a turn-over of 
employees as well.  This participant believed that this may affect how some things are effectively
managed periodically, but overall felt that many people in the company were knowledgeable and 
well-informed on the Agreement and its related activities, processes, and issues.  
While having too many people involved was a concern for many participants, two elders 
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no real consultation was taking place at the community level, notwithstanding community 
representation on the AWG and member participation in the monitoring program. These elders 
were 
 
 
ity] 
, and that 
 
 
r example, one industry participant felt that the terminology in the Agreement, 
articularly which associated with “spill-related events”, required some improvement. This 
eement how one knows if a spill event has 
 
sue 
the 
concerned that their local Board Members sitting on the AWG were “...not doing the job 
that they’re titled to” as “no consultation, sharing, or communication actually occurs”. 
Additionally, they suggested that community elders were not being recognized or held with
importance and that “...consultation has not been done with the community members, we’re [the
community] not aware of what has been happening” regarding the “environment or the 
Environmental Impact Agreement”. In this regard, one elder suggested that the “AWG should be 
revised and looked at and there should be appointed people to sit on that Board by [commun
members”. That being said, an industry representative commented that some community 
members have conveyed to industry that they “...are sick and tired of being consulted...”
has resulted from the monitoring program, although industry must continue to maintain and earn 
that trust.    
 
Transparency of the Environmental Agreement  
Terminology and the lack of clarity around impact reporting requirements also received some 
criticism. Fo
p
interviewee noted that it is not defined in the Agr
occurred and what the parameters are that define a spill event – the distinction between chronic
and acute events, and slow or gradual releasing spills versus single large events. A related is
concerned the potential breach of containments.  For instance, if a breach of containment 
occurred at any mining operation site, and in the event that something should extend beyond 
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company’s surface lease, not actually reaching the community but still having some type of 
effect, it was questioned as to whether the community would still have a damage or breach of 
containment claim and how this would be determined. It was further noted that “communi
of an impact or event [to communities] requires more clarification” as it is difficult to determine 
what constitutes an “event”.  This concern was similarly voiced by a number of community 
interviewees, noting that they had heard of events and spills taking place but had never been 
informed of them, and never heard of any monitoring or clean-up initiatives.  While it was 
affirmed by all industry, government, and consultant participants that no impacts have been 
detected downstream, local communities are aware of events occurring upstream at mine site
Issues around the nature of event reporting is a source of suspicion and scepticism in the 
community with regard to industry reporting practices. 
 
 
cation 
s.  
On-going review and transformation  
A final theme that emerged was that the Environmental Agreement itself needed to be revisited 
and potentially revised. Industry representatives felt that the Agreement had been in place for a 
substantial time period, and that it was time to turn back and ensure that the interests of both 
e industry officials questioned whether the monitoring 
s 
 
in 
 include 
parties are still being represented.  Som
program actually needed to continue as no impacts had been detected from the program, but 
conceded that since it was something that communities still requested then it still held 
significance in terms of comfort and reassurance that no off-site adverse environmental effect
were occurring. Elders from the Athabasca communities suggested that both the Agreement and
the AWG required revisions.  Specifically, greater community consultation and involvement 
decision-making was required, and the structure of the AWG should be re-organized to
greater input from elders by way of direct membership and participation on the AWG Board. 
 77
Some community representatives felt that long-term cumulative impacts and decommissioning of
mine sites should be explored in greater detail. Others emphasized that it was now time to re-
examine ideas such as benefit-sharing, First Nations as shareholders, and local stakeholders as 
receiving revenues and royalties as part of the next generation of negotiated Agreements.  
 
3.5 Observations and Conclusion 
Privatized agreements are becoming commonplace in resource development. This is particularly
the case in Canada’s northern mining industry where private partnerships, processes, and 
 
 
 
 
rograms are increasingly established and implemented amongst the mining industry and local 
rno and Bradshaw, 2008; Galbraith et al., 2007; 
ic, 
so within 
 
llow-up 
eassurance to local communities. While the program adheres to 
p
stakeholders.  Several studies (e.g. P
O’Faircheallaigh, 2007; Dryer and Meyers, 2004; Sosa and Keenan, 2001) have reported on the 
scope of these privatized agreements, noting their attention to a diversity of social, econom
and environmental issues largely affecting northern communities and natural resources.  That 
said, the literature on private agreements remains limited and recent, and particularly 
the context of the role of such agreements in post-decision EIA follow-up and effects monitoring
programs.  By examining the AWG Environmental Agreement in Northern Saskatchewan’s 
uranium industry, this paper attempted to contribute to a better understanding of such 
Agreements, and particularly whether and how they contribute to EIA follow-up and impact 
management practices.  
Based on the case study results, it is evident that the AWG Environmental Agreement 
supports EIA follow-up and post-development monitoring procedures. Nonetheless, fo
and monitoring under the AWG Environmental Agreement is designed primarily to provide 
comfort monitoring and r
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scient  to 
 
ic 
 
 
oring 
st in terms of direct industry 
regula  
an EIA 
d 
s EIA 
follow-up and regulatory processes continue to evolve from “...regulator-driven compliance-
ific approaches, such as testing and analytical methods, it does not hold scientific value
industry impact monitoring and regulatory-based EIA follow-up.  In addition, the samples from
the AWG are taken bi-annually, and are sometimes limited – fish sampling for example 
generally involves one fish per site; as a result, the program does not hold any real scientif
rigour or merit when compared to industry follow-up programs.  As sample locations are situated
far downstream from mining operations and facilities, no environmental effects have been 
detected within the vicinity of the northern communities to date.  
Consistent with O’Faircheallaigh (2007), the Environmental Agreement and monitoring
program does supplement the existing regulatory and industry environmental management 
regimes. However, the off-site comfort monitoring carried out under the  community monit
program does not play an immediate role in EIA follow-up – at lea
tion, or effects management decision making; neither does it have the capacity to replace
any of the existing elements of impact management or compliance-based EIA follow-up 
programs. Findings from the AWG case do not suggest a direct link between the rise of 
privatized agreements and the design and practice of EIA follow-up and effects management 
practices, nor do they indicate that the Environmental Agreement deliberately serves to offset 
failings in the design and practice of post-decision monitoring in the northern Saskatchew
process. Rather, monitoring under the Agreement primarily serves to provide comfort an
assurance to local stakeholders that no adverse environmental effects are taking place at the 
community level. 
That said, the Agreement does assist in accommodating and accounting for some of the 
gaps that conventional EIA follow-up and monitoring structures have difficulty in filling. A
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based approaches to a state of following-up for environmental management, with an increase
overall involvemen
 in 
t communication among all stakeholders...” (Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 
2005)
rom 
er 
 
proce
 in 
sts 
ased on 
on 
a and information from 
monit
, there is an important role to be played by Environmental Agreements, such as in the 
Athabasca case, and associated community-based monitoring programs and partnerships.  
From a follow-up perspective, and consistent with literature on privatized agreements f
elsewhere (see Prno and Bradshaw, 2008; Galbraith et al., 2007; O’Faircheallaigh, 2007), of 
notable benefit are increased levels of communication between local communities and the 
mining sector, building and establishing relationships among community and industry, great
involvement and participation in overall industry environmental planning and management
sses, improved community awareness regarding mining operations, and comfort that no 
measurable environmental effects are occurring downstream within the vicinity of local 
communities.   In other words, this form of comfort monitoring does play a significant role
bridging community and industry, and in improving industry image.  Although lacking the 
science for formal impact management purposes, the Agreement indirectly supports and assi
in EIA follow-up and industry impact management and operations.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of Environmental Agreements, challenges do exist. B
the case study, these challenges largely pertain to communication issues; continuity, coordinati
and consultation; transparency; and the need for on-going review and transformation of the 
Environmental Agreement.  Challenges such as communication may be attributed to language 
and culture barriers, which further complicate the transmission of dat
oring programs, resulting in knowledge gaps and uncertainty amongst communities about 
the effects of mining operations. These challenges are not unique to Environmental Agreements, 
but are ones that have plagued follow-up and EIA in general for some time. Like any good 
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follow-up program, the nature and scope of monitoring and follow-up under privatized 
agreements, and Environmental Agreements themselves, must be adaptive as new knowledge
gained and as expectations and objectives about industry and environmental performance and 
impact management change.    
 
3.5.1 Conclusion 
Privatized agreements are increasingly implemented and utilized in an attempt to effectively 
manage the environment while at the same time build relationships and trust between industry 
and local communities.  These a
 is 
 
 
greements have emerged as a unique tool, extensively “...used as 
 basis for addressing conflicts (or potential conflicts) arising from resource development on the 
 Indigenous peoples” (O’Faircheallaigh, 2002: 1), and therefore have a 
ent 
e” 
 
er, at 
, 
a
traditional lands of
valuable role in the realm of environmental management and decision-making from a propon
and community perspective. Privatized agreements are slowly being regarded as the “next phas
in EIA and northern development, and a standard means to partner with communities in the 
process of resource extraction and impact management. In this sense, privatized agreements are a
valuable addition to formal EIA follow-up and regulatory processes and procedures; howev
least in the case of Saskatchewan’s uranium industry, they may provide little direct scientific 
value to industry monitoring and impact management programs. Although privatized follow-up 
and monitoring programs may adhere to the participatory element of good-practice follow-up
their primary purpose is to provide comfort and reassurance to communities.   Comfort 
monitoring may be valuable for bridging community-industry relations, but if such programs are 
to be credible over the long term there remains a need to ensure that the results from comfort 
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monitoring are useful for, and integrated with, project effects monitoring and management 
practices.  
In conclusion, this paper suggests that no formal scientific role or relationship exists 
between Environmental Agreements and industry or regulatory EIA follow-up practices for th
purpose of monitoring and management; but such agreements and associated comfort monit
programs a
e 
oring 
re beneficial and continue to “...play an important role in fostering a collaborative 
vision
nd add 
 the 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
.1 Introduction 
IA and post-decision follow-up are now familiar concepts in Canada’s northern mining 
industry, and the state of development o xperienced significant changes since 
these concepts were first introduced. A resource development activity has 
ndergone a transformation process through environmental legislation and involvement with 
akeholders and the local public. These processes have not only shaped the present state of 
development and EIA, but will likely continue to inform future practices. Of particular interest in 
recent years, however, is the rise of Environmental Agreements.  Privatized arrangements 
between communities and industries focus on project impact mitigation, monitoring, and follow-
up (Galbraith et al., 2007).  Covering the entirety of a project, including construction, operation, 
rehabilitation, and decommission, these agreements seek to facilitate the participation of 
Aboriginal Peoples, governments, and resource developers in the environmental management of 
projects in ways that do not occur under existing regulatory regimes (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007).  
Privatized agreements may possess the potential to contribute to EIA follow-up – a practice that, 
although widely recognized, is reported to be less than satisfactory and weak in implementation.   
This thesis intended to advance current knowledge and understanding on a contemporary 
research challenge in Canada’s northern resource development sector: the role and contribution 
of privatized agreements in EIA follow-up and impact management practices.  In order to 
accomplish this, the uranium mining industry in northern Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin was 
adopted as a case study.  Based on the case study, this thesis set out to:  
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4.2 Institutional development and changing roles and stakes of EIA follow-up 
 
The institutional development of EIA follow-up in Saskatchewan’s uranium industry has 
experienced transformation and evolution, distinguished best as one of discontinuity.  Consistent 
with literature (e.g. Marshall et al. 2005, Morrison-Saunders and Arts, 2005, Noble and Storey, 
2005), the findings from this thesis suggest that the primary focus of EIA follow-up has 
ment, and 
 
 
ts and 
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ent 
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n 
) examine the institutional development of EIA follow-up and its changing roles and 
stakes; and  
(2) examine the role and contribution of community-based Environmental Agreements
EIA follow-up and impact management practices.  
 
experienced two broad shifts, which include an emphasis on environmental manage
incorporating a ‘community-centric’ approach, where greater communication among local
stakeholders and proponents regarding development projects is now being conducted.  
Furthermore, while past monitoring programs predominantly concentrated on biophysical effects
and compliance monitoring, the Athabasca case study indicates that socioeconomic effec
issues are increasingly being recognized and incorporated into monitoring programs. 
In addition to changes in follow-up programs, the findings from this case study also 
indicate a transformation in roles and stakes of the parties involved in follow-up.  Both 
community and industry have increased their presence and involvement in follow-up and 
monitoring programs.  Through various partnerships, committees, and groups, many northern 
communities now play a greater role in environmental regulation of industry developm
gh these privatized agreements. As the importance of corporate and social responsibil
the mining sector has increased, industry has emerged with a much stronger role and stake i
follow-up and monitoring programs.   
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This transformation of follow-up can be categorized into four timeframes, ranging from 
little or no follow-up to a system that now includes a participatory yet privatized process 
encompassing privatized agreements between community and industry focusing on both 
community-based biophysical effects monitoring and community impact benefit monitoring.  
While this recent privatized system may be the new form of impact management in the northern 
minin ir 
 
 
ication 
nd relationship building between First Nations and industry proponents.  As such, these 
ractices.  That 
d 
ry-
ct of 
g development sector, these agreements remain confidential and little is known about the
role in and contribution to effective EIA follow-up and impact management practices.  
 
4.3 Role and contribution of Environmental Agreements to EIA follow-up 
Results from the northern Saskatchewan’s uranium mining industry indicate that privatized 
Environmental Agreements and community-led monitoring programs both complement and 
supplement formal EIA follow-up processes and procedures through enhanced commun
a
privatized agreements do have the potential to contribute to improved industry p
said, from a science and impact management perspective, Environmental Agreements are 
primarily utilized as comfort monitoring mechanisms to provide assurance to communities an
local stakeholders that no environmental impacts are occurring off-site from mining operations. 
These monitoring programs lack in scientific value to industry monitoring and to regulato
based EIA follow-up.  As a result, these privatized agreements do not play a direct role in EIA 
follow-up monitoring per se, nor do they possess the potential to formally replace any aspe
it.  Further, the AWG case study does not necessarily suggest a direct link between the rise of 
privatized agreements and the design and practice of EIA follow-up and impact management 
practices, nor does it indicate that the Environmental Agreement deliberately serves to offset 
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failings in the design and practice of post-decision monitoring in the northern Saskatchewan EIA
process. 
Notwithstanding the comfort monitoring aspect, and the lack of scientific value and direc
relationship to EIA follow-up, the AWG Environmental Agreement does provide a variety of 
benefits which assist in strengthening certain areas where conventional follow-up remains wea
Consistent with the literature on privatized agreements (see Prno and Bradshaw, 2008; Fidler and 
Hitch, 20
 
t 
k.  
07; Galbraith et al., 2007; O’Fairchellaigh, 2007), these benefits include, but are not 
limite
 
 
y 
hich approach or avenues must be taken to 
effectively contribute to northern resource development and impact management.  While 
education, cooperative environmental decision-making, and diversification at 
ern 
 
d to: bridging community and industry, building partnerships, transferring knowledge, and 
improving industry image.  A  number of challenges do remain, however, in linking up 
Environmental Agreements and monitoring programs with EIA follow-up, including issues 
related to communication of monitoring program results; coordination, commitment, and 
communication; transparency of the Environmental Agreement; and the need for on-going 
review and transformation of the Agreement itself.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Environmental Impact Assessment in the Canadian north is now better regulated and has a
clearer division of authority than when it was first introduced.  However, EIA remains a ver
restrictive process and practitioners must determine w
communication, 
both the stakeholder and proponent level are now recognized as important elements in north
resource development and in Canadian EIA, effective implementation and integration of these
concepts continue to move at a slow pace and are regarded as a continual struggle (Veiga et al., 
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2001).  Furthermore, although both formal follow-up and Environmental Agreements have
progressed in the areas of biophysical effects monitoring and community vitality monitoring, 
improvement is still required. There is every reason to expect continual process development in 
northern EIA, but experience suggests that it will continue to occur inconsistently and unevenly
(Mulvihill and Baker, 2001).   
Based on the case study of uranium mining in the Athabasca Basin, this thesis indicate
that EIA follow-up has indeed evolved and that part of this evolution is an emergence of 
privatization.  Privatized Environmental Agreements are relatively new in Canada’s northern 
resource sector and only recently have they begun to receive attention from the research 
community, and in particular, f
 
 
s 
rom the EIA community.  Given the private nature of these 
agree  
al 
ts.  This 
ing 
 
 do not 
have 
ments, they are difficult to assess and there is limited knowledge of their efficacy and the
role they play in formal EIA regulatory follow-up and impact management processes.   
The results and observations of this thesis point to several research areas where addition
inquiry would contribute to the understanding of EIA follow-up and privatized agreemen
work is just one example of follow-up and monitoring under privatized agreements support
the hypothesis that these agreements do not support directly follow-up under the regulatory EIA
process, but do provide particular benefits to follow-up processes. Privatized agreements
the capacity to replace EIA follow-up.  While these agreements are increasingly being 
utilized in efforts to incorporate collaborative and participatory approaches among industry and 
local communities, they remain confidential and are strictly an industry-led initiative with 
limited to no government involvement.  It is suggested here that additional case study research is 
required in northern Canada and abroad to further explore and advance the current and potential 
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role of these Agreements in facilitating EIA follow-up – a component of EIA that is essential to 
impact management, yet rarely done and rarely done well.  
There also emerges, however, a much broader question concerning privatized agreements – 
that is, whether they should even be utilized at all in the context of EIA follow-up.  While 
agreements undoubtedly are beneficial and are able to assist in filling some gaps that formal 
processes continue to struggle with, as privatized agreements they are removed from the public 
proce
er 
 
 
 
e is a 
 EIA 
 research about these agreements, 
know tudies 
sses and not subject to broader public debate or scrutiny as is follow-up under the 
regulatory EIA process. Without knowing whether follow-up and monitoring programs und
these agreements  actually adhere to the principles or intent that formal follow-up and impact
management practices strive for, it may be questioned whether privatized monitoring approaches
enhance the EIA process at all.  It is assumed, however, that some advancement in these
particular areas will be achieved as research continues to advance on privatized agreements 
through efforts, in part, led by the Canadian IBA Network.   
To conclude, privatized agreements continue to be utilized as a standard method of 
conducting business in northern Canada between industry and communities. As such, ther
continued need to assess their contributions to and the role they can or should play in formal
processes.  Recognizing the confidential nature of and limited
ledge and understanding remain a challenge. This research complemented previous s
on privatized agreements, but differed in its explicit attention to how privatized Environmental 
Agreements contributed to formal EIA follow-up and impact management processes.  Further 
case study research is recommended in northern Canada and abroad, concerning the potential 
role of these agreements in facilitating EIA follow-up.  In doing so, this will not only ensure 
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some consistency of findings and conclusions, but it may also help improve current and future 
post-decision follow-up and impact management practices in the Canadian north.  
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